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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
This II appeal II of a decision of the Third District Court 
is to the Utah Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction in 
accordance with Section 78A-4-103(e), Utah Code [appeals 
from non-capital "criminal" cases], even though this appeal 
effectively involves the "civil judgment" entered by reason 
of the "jurisdiction" statutorily-granted to the District 
Court to do so. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has concurrent jurisdiction 
to rule upon the "unconstitutionality of statute" presented 
to the District Court and also raised in this appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This appeal (and the predicate factual situation 
surrounding it) presents the following issues for review: 
1. The District Court erred in its ruling that 
the court had "no jurisdiction" to review 
Defendant's "set aside" motion involving the 
"civil judgment" arising from the filing of the 
Board's 24 September 2013 "order of restitution". 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Where the issue involves 
interpretation and application of a statute, the 
appellate court grants the trial court no 
deference but reviews the conclusion for 
correctness. Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy 
Clinic, Inc. vs Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1995); Young Electric Sign Company, 
Inc. VS State ex rel UDOT, 2005 UT App 169, 110 
7 
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P.3d 1118 (Utah Court of Appeals 2005). A trial 
court's conclusions of law in civil casesFOOTNOTE1 
are reviewed for correctness. United Park City 
Mines Company vs Greater Park City Company, 870 
P.2d 880, 885 (Utah Supreme Court 1993). This 
standard of review has also been referred to as a 
"correction of error standard". Jacobsen 
Investment Company vs State Tax Commission, 839 
P.2d 789, 790 (Utah Supreme Court 1992). 
"Correction of error" means that no particular 
deference is given to the trial court's ruling on 
questions of law. State vs Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 
(Utah Supreme Court 19 94) . The "correction of 
error" standard means that the appellate court 
decides the matter for itself and does not defer 
in any degree to the trial judge's determination 
of law. Howell vs Howell, 806 P. 2d 1209, 1211 
(Utah Court of Appeals 1993). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL. The 
"jurisdiction" of the District Court to "set 
aside" the "civil judgment" arising from the 
filing of the Board-prepared "Order of 
1Although this "case" is actually a 11 criminal case", the 
Defendant's "motions to set aside" the resultant "civil judgment" 
against him by reason of the Board's defective "order of 
restitution" are properly before the District Court. The 
controlling statutes [77-27-6 and 77-38a-402, Utah Code] 
expressly direct the Board to file its "restitution order" with 
the sentencing court, which was the Third District Court and 
Judge Skanchy. 
8 
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Restitution" was presented to the District Court 
in DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, dated/filed 24 April 2014, 
pages 5-10, RECORD at 296-301. 
2 . The Board's September 2013 "restitution order" 
is invalid, due to the fact---admitted by the 
Board---that the Board failed to conduct the "full 
hearing" (or any hearing, for that matter) on the 
"restitution" issue, as said "full hearing" was 
expressly required by Section 77-27-5 (3), Utah 
Code. STANDARD OF REVIEW: See #1, above. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL. Defendant's 
arguments concerning the Board's failure to afford 
him the statutorily-prescribed "full hearing" were 
presented to the District Court in DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE CIVIL JUDGMENT [LACK OF 
STATUTORILY-REQUIRED HEARING: 77-27-5], 
dated/filed 11 June 2014, RECORD at 545-546, and 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE CIVIL JUDGMENT [LACK OF STATUTORILY-
REQUIRED RESTITUTION HEARING: 77-27-5], 
dated/filed 11 June 2014, RECORD at 547-557. 
3 . The Board's September 2013 "restitution order" 
is invalid, due to the fact that the State's claim 
for "restitution" would have time-barred by the 2-
year statute of limitation of Section 78B-2-
304(2), Utah Code [for "wrongful death"] and the 
9 
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Board was statutorily-precluded from awarding 
"restitution" for "pecuniary damages" for such 
time-barred losses, in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 77-38a-102(6), Utah Code. 
Thus, the Board's September 2014 "res ti tut ion 
order" is, in essence, ultra vires of its 
statutorily-granted authorities and the civil 
judgment resulting from the filing thereof should 
be set aside. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: See #1, above. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL. Defendant's 
arguments concerning the Board's "ultra vires" 
action in ordering "restitution" for "funeral 
expenses" already time-barred by the 2-year 
"wrongful death" statute of limitation were 
presented to the District Court within DEFENDANT'S 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL, dated/filed 24 April 2014, pages 19-27, 
thereof. RECORD at 310-318. 
4 . The Board's September 2013 "restitution order" 
is invalid, due to the fact that the September 
2014 "restitution order"---the "order" which was 
actually filed with the District Court and for 
which the filing thereof creates the "civil 
judgment" sought to be set aside---was not "made 
within sixty days" of the Defendant's release from 
prison, as expressly required by Section 77-27-
10 
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6(4), Utah Code. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: See #1, above. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL. Defendant's 
arguments concerning the Board's failure to afford 
him the statutorily-prescribed "full hearing 11 were 
presented to the District Court in DEFENDANT'S 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE RESTITUTION ORDER, dated/filed 12 November 
2013. RECORD at 131-135. 
5. The provisions of Section 77-27-5 (3), Utah 
Code [administrative decisions (including 
restitution) and orders of the Board of Pardons 
decisions are not subject to any 11 judicial 
review 11 ] is unconstitutional, as violative of 
Article I, Section 11 [ 11 open courts" provisions] 
of the Utah Constitution. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: See #1, above. A validly-
adopted statute is afforded a "strong presumption 
of constitutionality". See Maxfield vs Herbert, 
2012 UT 44, 115, 284 P.3d 647 (Utah Supreme Court 
2012); Peterson vs Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, 1 
23, 48 P.3d 941 (Utah Supreme Court 2002). The 
challenging party has a "heavy burden" to show the 
statute is unconstitutional. See Jones vs Utah 
Board of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, 1 10, 94 
P.3d 283 (Utah Supreme Court 2004). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL. Defendant, s . 
11 
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claims as to the "unconstitutionality" of Section 
77-27-5 (3), Utah Code, were presented to the 
District Court pursuant to and within DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTE [77-27-5 (3)], 
dated/filed 21 April 2014. RECORD at 283-285. See 
also "Defendant's Notification to Utah Attorney 
General", dated 21 April 2014 [RECORD at 290-291] 
and "Defendant's Memorandum in Support", dated 24 
April 2014. RECORD 292-318. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
[Subsection 77-27-6(4), Utah Code] 
(4) If the defendant, upon termination or 
expiration of sentence owes outstanding fines, 
restitution, or other assessed costs, or if the 
board makes an order of restitution within 60 days 
after the termination or expiration of the 
defendant's sentence, the matter shall be referred 
to the district court for civil collection 
remedies. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall 
forward a restitution order to the sentencing 
court to be entered on the judgment docket. The 
entry shall constitute a lien and is subject to 
the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil 
judgment. 
[Points I' II] 
[Subsection 77-27-5(1) (c), Utah Code] 
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, 
forfeiture, or restitution remitted, no parole, 
pardon, or commutation granted or sentence 
terminated, except after a full hearing before the 
board or the board's appointed examiner in open 
session. Any action taken under this subsection 
other than by a majority of the board shall be 
affirmed by a majority of the board. 
[Point II] 
[Subsection 77-27-6(2) (b), Utah Code] 
(2) (b) In accordance with Section 77-38a-
302(5) (d) (ii), the board may order that a 
defendant make restitution for pecuniary damages 
12 
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that were not determined by the court, unless the 
board applying the criteria as set forth in 
Section 77-38a-302 determines that restitution is 
inappropriate. 
[Point III] 
[Subsection 77-38a-102(6), Utah Code] 
( 6) 11 Pecuniary damages II means all demonstrable 
economic injury, whether or not incurred, which a 
person could recover in a civil action arising out 
of the facts or events cons ti tu ting the 
defendant's criminal activities ... 
[Subsection 77-27-6(2) (c), Utah Code] 
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (2) (d), the 
board shall make all orders of restitution within 
60 days after the termination or expiration of the 
defendant's sentence. 
[Point IV] 
[Section 77-27-5(3), Utah Code] 
( 3) Decisions of the board in cases involving 
paroles, pardons, commutations or terminations of 
sentence, restitution, or remission of fines and 
forfeitures are final and are not subject to 
judicial review .... 
[Point VJ 
[Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial 
and unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any 
tribunal in the State, by himself or counsel, any 
civil cause to which he is a party. 
[Point VJ 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. In March 2006 Defendant DENNIS J GARCIA was the driver 
of a motor vehicle involved in a single-vehicle accident in 
which his passenger Shane Buckley was killed. Defendant 
GARCIA was arrested at the scene and charged with Automobile 
Homicide, a third-degree felony. RECORD at 1-3. 
2. On 25 February 2008 Gail Buckley, the court-appointed 
13 
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Personal Representative of the Estate of Thomas Shane 
Buckley, Deceased filed a district court lawsuit [Civil No. 
080903244] against GARCIA for "wrongful death" and/or 
related expenses incurred in the March 2006 automobile 
accident and related events which gave rise to the criminal 
charges against GARCIA. FOOTNOTE2 The civil case was defended 
by private attorneys hired by the liability insurance 
carrier for the GARCIA-owned motor vehicle involved in the 
accident. Eventually, Gail Buckley in her individual and 
official Personal Representative capacity settled with the 
insurance carrier and received the sum of $25, 000---the 
"policy limits"---for the claim of loss, in behalf of the 
estate and the heirs. GARCIA was unaware whether the State 
of Utah or any of its agencies---except for UDOT, which was 
paid on a "property damage" claim---made claim upon the 
"estate" of the deceased. Gail Buckley in her individual and 
official Personal Representative capacities signed a two-
page "General Release and Settlement Document" [RECORD at 
365-367; ATTACHMENT 7 to this BRIEF], by which all claims 
against GARCIA (and his insurance company) would be released 
2The Buckley-filed, on 25 February 2008, 11 wrongful 
death II litigation was timely, as being before the expiration 
of the applicable 2-year statute of limitation therefor. 
[Section 78B-2-304(2), Utah Code.] The Buckley complaint 
pleaded only Mrs Buckley---albeit in her individual and 
"personal representative" capacities---as the Plaintiff 
therein. Neither the Utah Office for Crime Victims 
Reparations [ 11 CVR 11 ] nor any other Utah governmental agency 
was pleaded as a party therein, nor was the CVR's $7,000 
reimbursement to her expressly identified as such. 
14 
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and forever discharged. GARCIA was generally unaware of the 
disposition of claims made or which should have been made 
within the "probate case" of the deceased, Thomas Shane 
Buckley. See AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J GARCIA IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF RESTITUTION, dated 7 November 
2013, 1 8, RECORD at 128-129. 
3. On 17 April 2008, following a one-day jury trial, 
Defendant GARCIA was convicted of the charged felony 
offense. Following that conviction, GARCIA was immediately 
ordered into custody pending sentencing. See AFFIDAVIT OF 
DENNIS J GARCIA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF 
RESTITUTION, dated 7 November 2013, 1 2. RECORD at 127. 
4. On 2 June 2008 GARCIA was sentenced by the trial judge 
(the Honorable Randall N Skanchy of the Third District 
Court) to serve an indeterminate sentence, not exceeding 
five years incarceration. Judge Skanchy announced that 
GARCIA would be "given credit for time served". Judge 
Skanchy announced that the "restitution" would be left 
"open"; no restitution was ordered at time of sentencing. 
See AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J GARCIA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE ORDER OF RESTITUTION, dated 7 November 2013, 1 3. 
RECORD at 127. 
5 . No "restitution" was ordered by the District Court 
within one year of sentencing. In fact, no "res ti tut ion 11 - - -
of any kind and in any amount---has, to my knowledge, ever 
been ordered by the District Court. GARCIA was never been 
notified of any District Court "restitution" hearing or 
15 
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proceeding, was never been given opportunity to participate 
in any such proceeding, nor did GARCIA knowingly waive his 
rights to be notified of and/or participate in such 
proceedings. See AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J GARCIA IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF RESTITUTION, dated 7 November 
2013, 1 4, RECORD at 127. 
6. GARCIA served a five-year period of continuous 
incarceration, without interruption: from 17 April 2008 
(following the jury conviction) until his release on 15 
April 2013 from the Utah State Prison, upon full and 
complete expiration of the Court-imposed sentence. At the 
time of GARCIA'S release from prison on the herein-
referenced felony conviction, he had no other "charges" or 
convictions against him for which the Utah Department of 
Corrections had jurisdiction over him or for which he was 
being held or serving "time". See AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J 
GARCIA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF 
RESTITUTION, dated 7 November 2013, 1 5, RECORD at 127-128. 
7. During his five-year period of incarceration at the 
Utah State Prison and up to just weeks before his release 
from prison, GARCIA routinely checked through the "NORMS" 
database---a service regularly provided to inmates---as to 
whether there were any unpaid fines, "restitution" or 
similar unresolved claims or holds against me: there were 
none. [See ATTACHMENT 11 to this BRIEF.] His bi-monthly 
written account statements always reflected a "$0.00 11 
balance for any "restitution" to be paid. See AFFIDAVIT OF 
16 
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DENNIS J GARCIA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF 
RESTITUTION, dated 7 November 2013, 1 6, RECORD at 128. 
8. During his five-year incarceration at the Utah State 
Prison and up to and through his release from incarceration 
(in April 2013), GARCIA was never notified of any 
"restitution" hearing (to be held by the Third District 
Court or the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole), was never 
invited to participate in such a hearing (in either forum), 
did not participate in such a hearing, and never knowingly 
waived his right to participate in such a hearing. See 
AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J GARCIA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE ORDER OF RESTITUTION, dated 7 November 2013, 1 7, 
RECORD at 128. 
9. Actions (and/or inaction) undertaken by GARCIA and by 
his liability insurance carrier were in reasonable and good 
faith reliance upon the efficacy of the "General Release and 
Settlement Document" signed by Gail Buckley in her official 
Personal Representative capacity. See AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J 
GARCIA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF 
RESTITUTION, dated 7 November 2013, 1 9, RECORD at 129; 
ATTACHMENT 7 to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
10. GARCIA was given no notice of any "restitution hearing" 
ostensibly held by the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole 
prior to or subsequent to or as a condition of his April 
2013 release from incarceration. GARCIA did not participate 
in any such hearing and he did not knowingly waive his right 
to participate in any such hearing, at any time or place. 
17 
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See AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J GARCIA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE ORDER OF RESTITUTION, dated 7 November 2013, 1 10, 
RECORD at 129-130. 
11. Until GARCIA received (in late-October 2013) written 
correspondence from the Utah Office of Debt Collection as to 
a claimed $9,000+ 11 debt 11 , claimed-to-be owed by him to the 
State, GARCIA was unaware of any such claimed "debt" or his 
liability for payment thereof. See AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J 
GARCIA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF 
RESTITUTION, dated 7 November 2013, 111, RECORD at 129-130. 
12. On 15 April 2013 Defendant GARCIA was released from the 
Utah State Prison, his 5-year sentence for the felony 
conviction having expired. See AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J GARCIA 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF RESTITUTION, 
dated 7 November 2013, 1 3, RECORD at 127. 
13. On or about 24 September 2013 the Honorable Clark A 
Harms, Chairman of the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole 
prepared and signed, in behalf of the Board, a one-page 
"ORDER OF RESTITUTION". The "ORDER" was forwarded to and 
received by the Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County and "entered" on the "judgment 
docket" about 11 October 2013. RECORD at 119. [ATTACHMENT 1 
to this BRIEF] 
14. On 8 November 2013 GARCIA filed his "set aside" motion. 
RECORD at 122-125. 
15. On 13 January 2014 the UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND 
PAROLE, represented by Assistant Attorney General Sharel 
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Reber, and the UTAH OFFICE OF DEBT COLLECTION, represented 
by Assistant Attorney General Amanda Jex, orally petitioned 
the Third District Court for voluntary "intervention", as 
claimed "real-parties-in-interest, in the case. The two 
state agencies' petitions were granted by the District Court 
and the entities have continuously participated in the 
"civil judgment" proceedings thereafter. See RECORD at 155-
218 [Board's "OPPOSITION" memorandum, dated 6 February 2014, 
with extensive attachments] and RECORD 221-275 [Utah Office 
of Debt Collection's "CONTRA MEMORANDUM", dated 13 February 
2014, with extensive attachments]. 
16. In April 2014 the District Court---the Honorable 
Randall N Skanchy- - -ruled the District Court had II no 
jurisdiction" to set aside the "civil judgment" arising from 
the filing of the Board-filed "order of restitution". RECORD 
at 279-282. [ATTACHMENT 2 to this BRIEF] The Defendant made 
timely (within 10 days) "motion for new trial", in addition 
to other related motions, including a claim for the judicial 
determination of the unconstitutionality of the provisions 
of Section 77-27-5 (3), Utah Code (purporting to prohibit any 
judicial review of Board of Pardons decisions). RECORD at 
284-285. 
17. On 28 August 2014 the District Court issued its 
"memorandum decision" [RECORD at 593-596; ATTACHMENT 3 to 
this BRIEF] denying the Defendant's motions (for new trial, 
and so forth), but did not sign the actual Court-directed 
but Board:..prepared "ORDER OF THE COURT" until over a month 
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later (29 September 2014). RECORD at 604-607 [ATTACHMENT 4 
to this BRIEF.] 
18. On 25 October 2014 the Defendant DENNIS J GARCIA filed 
his "Notice of Appeal". RECORD at 611-612. 
SUMMARIES OF ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL 
1. The District Court erred in its ruling that the court 
had "no jurisdiction" to review Defendant's "set aside" 
motion involving the "restitution order" and/or, more 
specifically, the resultant "civil judgment" arising from 
the filing thereof. The two statutes expressly applicable to 
the "making" of a "restitution order" by the Parole Board 
additionally direct the filing thereof with the District 
Court, as the "sentencing court" of the underlying felony 
criminal case, from which the Board (upon incarceration in 
the state prison) has jurisdiction over the individual. That 
"filing" (of the "restitution order") has the effect- - -
statutorily prescribed---of creating a "civil judgment" 
against the Defendant. However, those same statutes 
expressly provide that the "civil judgment" so created is 
"subject to ·the same rules as a judgment for money in a 
civil judgment". The "civil judgment" thus entered is not, 
per se, tied to the "sentencing" function of the District 
Court as part of the original criminal conviction; rather, 
the Board's filing of its "restitution order" has the effect 
of reinvesting the District Court with "civil jurisdiction", 
which includes the Rule 60(b) remedies to "set aside" the 
"civil judgment". 
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2. The Board's September 2013 "restitution order" is 
invalid, due to the fact---admitted by the Board---that the 
Board failed to conduct the "full hearing" (or any hearing, 
for that matter) on the "restitution" issue, as said "full 
hearing" was expressly required by Section 77-27-5 (3), Utah 
Code. The excuses advanced by the Board to justify its 
failure to hold the "restitution hearing"---namely, an 
unsubstantiated, undocumented and unproved "waiver" of his 
right to the II full hearing" - - -are legally and factually 
unavailing to the Board. 
3 . The Board's September 2013 "restitution order" is 
invalid, due to the fact that the State 1 s claim for 
"restitution" would have time-barred by the 2-year statute 
of limitation of Section 78B-2-304 (2), Utah Code [for 
"wrongful death"] and the Board was statutorily-precluded 
from awarding "restitution" for "pecuniary damages" for such 
time-barred losses, in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 77-38a-102(6), Utah Code. Thus, the Board's 
September 2014 "restitution order" is, in essence, ultra 
vires of its statutorily-granted aut~orities; the civil 
judgment resulting from the filing thereof should be set 
aside. 
4 . The Board's September 2013 "restitution order" is 
invalid, due to the fact that the September 2014 
"restitution order"---the "order" which was actually filed 
with the District Court and for which the filing thereof 
creates the "civil judgment" sought to be set aside---was 
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not "made within sixty days" of the Defendant's release from 
prison, as required by Section 77-27-6(4), Utah Code. 
5. The provisions of Section 77-27-5(3), Utah Code 
[administrative decisions (including restitution) and orders 
of the Board of Pardons decisions are not subject to any 
judicial review] is unconstitutional, as violative of 
Article I, Section 11 ["open courts" provisions] of the Utah 
Constitution. The statutory terms---expressly prohibiting 
any and all "judicial review" of Board decisions---are clear 
on their face and are incapable of any reasonable 
interpretation which avoids the unconstitutional result. 
That the Utah Supreme Court in previous cases has avoided 
addressing the obvious "unconstitutionality" of Section 77-
27-5 (3) - - -because the Supreme Court in those cases was not 
requested to do so---is no reason for this appellate court 
to refuse the claims of this Defendant, who certainly has 
"standing" to raise this issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING 
THAT THE COURT HAD 11 NO JURISDICTION" TO CONSIDER 
AND RULE UPON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO "SET ASIDE" 
THE "CIVIL JUDGMENT" RESULTING FROM 
THE FILING AND ENTRY OF THE "ORDER OF RESTITUTION" 
Attempting to avoid having the District Court "set 
aside" its 24 September 2013 "Order of Restitution", 
Intervenor UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS [hereinafter "the BOARD" or 
simply "the Board"] argued [RECORD at 158] and the District 
Court agreed and ruled [RECORD at 279-282 (11 April 2014), 
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··\iii) 
RECORD 59?-595 (Memorandum Decision and Order": 21 August 
2014) and RECORD at 604-608 (Court Order: 29 September 
2014)] that the Court had 11 no jurisdiction" to consider and 
grant Defendant's "set aside" motion. [Photocopies of these 
District Court rulings are attached hereto as addenda to 
this APPELLANT'S BRIEF: ATTACHMENT No. 2, ATTACHMENT No. 3 
and ATTACHMENT No. 4, respectively.] The District Court 
erred in its "no jurisdiction" rulings. 
A 
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution, 
provides in relevant part: 
The judicial power of the state shall be 
vested in a supreme court, in a trial court of 
general jurisdiction known as the district court, 
and in such other courts as the Legislature by 
statute may establish. 
Emphasis added. 
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution, 
pertaining to the "jurisdiction of the District Court", 
provides in relevant part: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by 
this constitution or by statute, and power to 
issue all extraordinary writs .... 
Emphasis added. 
The foregoing II constitutional II provisions have been 
incorporated into statute, codified at Section 78A-5-102, 
Utah Code, which provides in relevant part: 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction 
in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in 
the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
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Emphasis added. 
The "jurisdiction" in the instant situation arises and 
is authoritatively controlled by Subsection 77-27-6 (4), Utah 
Code, pertaining to the Board's authority to "order 
restitution" by a person under its control. Subsection 77-
27-6(4) provides in its entirety: 
(4) If the defendant, upon termination or 
expiration of sentence owes outstanding fines, 
restitution, or other assessed costs, or if the 
board makes an order of restitution within 60 days 
after the termination or expiration of the 
defendant's sentence, the matter shall be referred 
to the district court for civil collection 
remedies. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall 
forward a restitution order to the sentencing 
court to be entered on the judgment docket. The 
entry shall constitute a lien and is subject to 
the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil 
judgment. 
Emphasis added. 
The first sentence will be analyzed in greater detail 
in Point IV of this APPELLANT'S BRIEF [pp. 46-51], but the 
closing phrase "the matter shall be referred to the district 
court for civil collection remedies" while initially 
appearing to be perhaps somewhat vague (ala "referred to the 
district court" and "for civil collection remedies") , 
deliberate thought proves otherwise: a legislative 
investiture of 11 jurisdiction 11 ---namely "civil" jurisdiction-
--to the District Court. Correspondingly, there could be no 
"civil collection remedies" if there were not some kind of 
"jurisdiction" for the District Court to first enter some 
kind of "judgment" to be collected upon by the affected 
claimant. 
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That a 11 judgment 11 ---for which "jurisdiction" of some 
kind is a fundamental conceptual prerequisite---will arise 
is made clear by the final two sentences of Subsection 77-
27-6(4), thus: 
. . . The Board of Pardons and Parole shall 
forward a restitution order to the sentencing 
court to be entered on the judgment docket. The 
entry shall constitute a lien and is subject to 
the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil 
judgment. 
Emphasis added. The phrase "forward a restitution order to 
the sentencing court to be entered on the judgment docket" 
is significant: the text confirms the Legislature's 
investiture of "jurisdiction" to "enter" the "restitution 
order" on the District Court's "judgment docket". The second 
sentence---namely 
The entry [of the Board-prepared "order of 
restitution" upon the judgment docket] shall 
constitute a lien and is subject to the same rules 
as a judgment for money in a civil judgment. 
[Bracketed text added for clarity] 
---is even more clear as to the legislative intent: the thus 
"entered" order of restitution "is subject to the same rules 
as a judgment for money in a civil judgment". Emphasis 
added. [While the phrase "shall constitute a lien" is 
arguably confusing in the traditional "lien" sense of that 
word, the "judgment" term---utilized twice---is absolutely 
clear.] It is this "civil judgment" terminology which gives 
rise to the Defendant's usage of that terminology to 
describe the object of his "set aside" motion. 
The closing phrase---pertaining to the "entry" of the 
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Board's "order of restitution" upon the District Court's 
"judgment docket"---"and is subject to the same rules" 
applies not only to the rules pertaining to the "collection" 
of the "civil judgment 11 , but must also encompass and include 
those 11 rules 11 ---for example, Rule 60 (b) ---providing for the 
"setting aside" of the former "judgment" in appropriate 
cases. FOOTNOTE3 
The provisions of the Utah "Crime Victims Restitution 
Act", codified at Section 77-38a-101 et seq, Utah Code, are 
supportive of the foregoing analysis. Although most of the 
provisions of the Crime Victims Restitution Act are 
generally applicable only to the sentencing court, a few 
narrowly-drawn and specifically-referenced procedural 
provisions are expressly made applicable to Board-ordered 
11 restitution 11 matters, as per Sections 77-27-3 and 77-27-5, 
applicable to the Board. Subsection 77-38a-401 (4), Utah 
Code, also applicable to the situation, describes the 11 civil 
judgment" as follows: 
3 The Defendant's simultaneously-filed Rule 60 (b) (6) 
motion to "set aside" the "civil judgment" is authorized and 
meritorious under that Rule, which provides: 
.. On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: 
(6) any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment. 
Emphasis added. 
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A judgment ordering restitution, ... is subject 
to the same rules as a judgment in a civil action. 
Emphasis added. 
B 
Judge Skanchy' s "no jurisdiction" ruling is seems 
confused and inconsistent. In his 11 April 2014 "MEMORANDUM 
DECISION" ruling upon Defendant's original "set aside" 
motion, Judge Skanchy wrote: 
Utah Code Ann. , Subsection ( 5) ( d) (ii) , 
provides that" [a]ny pecuniary damages that have 
not been determined by the court within one year 
after sentencing may be determined by the Board of 
Pardons and Parole." Utah courts have long 
recognized that "Once a court imposes a valid 
sentence, it loses subject matter jurisdiction 
over the case." State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 
679 (Utah App. 1991); State V. Vaughn, 2011 UT App 
411, ~ 11, 266 P. 3d 202. This Court entered a 
valid sentence in this case, and thereby lost 
subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, once the 
one-year period after sentencing expired, this 
Court also lost jurisdiction over Mr. Garcia's 
restitution obligation. Jurisdiction moved to the 
Board to determine restitution owed. 
The Court hereby concludes that it lacks 
jurisdiction to set aside the Board's claim for 
restitution against Mr. Garcia. The Board's claim 
is not subject to judicial review by this Court. 
The Court imposed a prison sentence on June 2, 
2008, thereby losing subject matter jurisdiction. 
Once the one-year period after sentencing by this 
Court expired, the Court further lost jurisdiction 
over Mr. Garcia's restitution obligation. 
Jurisdiction moved to the Board at the expiration 
of the Court's jurisdiction over restitution. 
Accordingly, Mr. Garcia's Motion to Set Aside 
Restitution is denied. 
Emphasis added. Pages 3 - 4 of District Court "MEMORANDUM 
DECISION". RECORD at 281-282. Copy thereof at ATTACHMENT 2 
in the Addenda to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
As can be seen from the foregoing quoted material, the 
District Court [Judge Skanchy] misapprehended and/or failed 
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to consider the applicable statutes (and/or Defendant 
GARCIA'S arguments thereon): that under Section 77-27-6(4) 
the District Court lS REINVESTED (or reinstated) "with 
jurisdiction", even 11 civil 11 jurisdiction. That REINSTATED 
11 jurisdiction 11 arises pursuant to the Board's "refer [ring)" 
its 11 restitution order" for "entry on the [Court's] judgment 
docket", which essentially creates the "civil judgment" 
herein sought to be "set aside''. [Quoted terms are from 77-
2 7 - 6 ( 4) ; bracketed term added for clarity. ] It is that 
REINSTATED "jurisdiction 11 which the District Court could 
have and should have exercised. 
The District Court's II jurisdiction II over the "civil 
judgment 11 arising from the 11 ref erring" and 11 forwarding" of 
the Board - prepared 11 restitution order" and its "entry" is 
not tied to or part of the court's 11 sentencing 11 function . 
The II civil judgment 11 issues described by and arising under 
the Section 77-27 - 6 (4) -identified processes and events have 
nothing to do with "sentencing" and/or 11 restitution 11 which 
might have been initially associated therewith. 
[Judge Skanchy's statement (i.e. 11 The Board's claim is 
not subject to judicial review by this Court. 11 ) contained 
within the second paragraph quoted above raises the 
"unconstitutionality of statute 11 issue described in Point V 
of this APPELLANT'S BRIEF.) 
Notwithstanding whatever the Judge Skanchy-referenced 
11 cases 11 [Montoya and Vaughn] may have held (or even stated 
in dicta ) as to the criminal court generally 11 losing 11 its 
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"jurisdiction" upon sentencing, those cases did not decide 
the statutory reinvestiture of "jurisdiction" for these 
"restitution" matters at issue in this situation. 
Judge Skanchy' s "district court loses jurisdiction upon 
sentencing" analysis and conclusion is internally-
inconsistent and flawed. Judge Skanchy expressly recognizes 
the statutory "one year" extension (or retention) of the 
Court's "jurisdiction" so as to order "restitution". See 
Subsection 7 7 - 3 8 a - 3 0 2 ( 5 ) ( d) ( i ) AND 7 7 - 3 8 A - 3 0 2 ( 5 ) ( d) ( ii ) . 
Those provisions constitute a statutory exception to the 
"court loses jurisdiction upon sentencing" general rule. 
Likewise, the reinstatement of "civil jurisdiction" pursuant 
to Subsection 77-27-6(4) is a similar statutory exception. 
For the proposition that a sentencing court has 
statutory "jurisdiction" to enter court-ordered restitution 
even beyond the "one year" following sentencing, see The 
State of Utah, Petitioner, vs Claudia Laycock, Judge, 2009 
UT 53, 214 P.3d 103 (Utah Supreme Court 2009). 
The Board's arguments---that the District Court has "no 
jurisdiction" to set aside the "entered" restitution order--
-are disingenuous and flawed, for a variety of reasons: 
1. The Board filed ("forwarded") the "order of 
restitution" to the District Court, in procedural 
compliance with the statute: for the purpose of 
creating the "civil judgment" it seeks to take 
advantage of. The Board cannot now to be heard to 
claim that the District Court "has no 
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jurisdiction" to enter the 11 judgment 11 which the 
Board's "filing" (and/or "forward[ing] 11 and 
"refer [ing] 11 successfully brought into existence. 
2. The Board's assertion that Defendant GARCIA is 
limited to a Rule 6 5B "extraordinary relief 11 
remedy against the Parole Board [under subsection 
D(2) of the Rule] is disingenuous and flawed. If 
the District Court has "jurisdiction" to entertain 
a Rule 65B claim, the District Court has 
"jurisdiction" for a Rule 60 motion. Neither Rule 
65B nor Rule 60 expressly purports to create or 
grant "jurisdiction" to the District Court; both 
rules recognize the "jurisdiction" the District 
Court already possesses.FOOTNOTE 4 
The "no jurisdiction" argument of the Board and of the 
Utah Office of Debt Collection---ostensibly made for the 
4Any "new" Rule 65B proceeding filed anew against the 
Parole Board would at best be suited to judicially mandate 
the Board to do something: i.e. actually hold the 
"restitution hearing" the Board neglected to hold in 2010 
(or any other time) . As the Defendant has long been released 
from Board custody, the Board has no statutory authority to 
hold such a hearing, even pursuant to judicial directive. 
The Court would not order the Board to do something the 
Board was statutorily unable to do. 
Similarly, Rule 65B "extraordinary relief" (to hold a 
hearing??) would not necessarily "set aside" the previously-
entered "civil judgment", entered in favor of the Utah 
Office for Victims of Crime. If such a result were 
contemplated and authorized pursuant to Rule 65B and the 
District Court had jurisdiction, the District Court would 
already have "jurisdiction" to "set aside" under Rule 60 (b). 
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short-term purpose of avoiding judicial scrutiny of 
Defendant's "set aside" claims---and the District Court's 
acceptance of the argument is illogical and will prove to be 
misguided and self-defeating in the long-run: IF the 
District Court has 11 no jurisdiction", then the District 
Court cannot conduct "supplementary proceedings" to 
ascertain the defendant's assets to pay the "civil 
judgment 11 • Likewise, the District Court would have "no 
jurisdiction" to issue a writ of garnishment (for wages 
and/or for bank accounts) or a writ of execution (other 
property) to seize and sell, to satisfy the "civil 
judgment". The "civil judgment"---except for the personal 
inconvenience and detriment experienced by the defendant for 
injury to his "credit rating" and the consequential damage 
to employment and housing opportunities- - -has become a 
meaningless, "judicial nullity", incapable of effective 
enforcement. This result---of "no jurisdiction" to pursue 
these identified post-judgment remedies- - -would be the 
situation not only for Defendant GARCIA in this case, but 
for ALL CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS statewide, in all Board-ordered 
"restitution" cases---a result the Legislature certainly has 
not intended. 
Pursuant to the foregoing statutes, the District Court-
--as "the sentencing court" to which the "order of 
restitution" has been "referred" and has been "entered on 
the judgment docket" - - - is invested with "civil jurisdiction 11 
over the "restitution order" (and, more particularly, the 
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resulting "civil judgment") which arises from the 11 entry 11 
thereof. This conferring of "civil jurisdiction'', arising 
from the foregoing statutes, exists and continues 
irrespective of and unrelated to the Court's long-expired 
authority to "order" that "restitution" be paid as part of 
the criminal sentence imposed against a convicted defendant. 
The District Court DOES HAVE "jurisdiction" to consider 
the Defendant's II set aside" motion. The District Court's "no 
jurisdiction" rulings are clearly in error and must be 
reversed.FOOTNOTE 5 
II 
THE BOARD'S ACKNOWLEDGED FAILURE 
TO CONDUCT A "FULL HEARING" 
CONCERNING THE "RESTITUTION" 
TO BE ORDERED AGAINST DEFENDANT 
INVALIDATES THE BOARD-MADE "ORDER OF RESTITUTION", 
ITSELF VOID AB INITIO, WHICH RENDERS 
DEFECTIVE, INEFFECTIVE AND ILLEGAL 
THE "CIVIL JUDGMENT" WHICH SHOULD BE SET ASIDE 
Early in the post-incarceration litigation process, the 
Board readily acknowledged [RECORD at pages 217-218] that NO 
"restitution hearing 11 was ever held by it prior to its 
"ordering" Defendant GARCIA to pay "restitution". See, for 
5 The Court of Appeals should proceed to decide each 
of the following- - -Points II through IV, of this APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF- - - issues, previously presented to the District Court. 
The Court of Appeals decision should be "on-the-merits" 
thereof. Defendant GARCIA- - -constantly facing" execution" of 
or a "writ of garnishment" under the "civil judgment" (for 
$ 7, O O O) , and/ or the adverse impact upon his II credit report" 
and potential employment and housing opportunities---ought 
not to have to wait for two more years on his "set aside" 
motion, while under those adverse burdens which should have 
never arisen. 
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example, Board-filed DECLARATION OF GREG JOHNSON, dated and 
filed February 2014 (as an· 11 exhibit 11 to Board's OPPOSITION 
TO "DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE RESTITUTION ORDER" memorandum), dated 6 February 
2014. [RECORD AT 155-167] Therein, the Board's 11 witness"---
Board Administrative Coordinator Greg Johnson---stated, in 
relevant part: 
5. Even though it is the Board's practice to use 
the recommended restitution amount included in 
Presentence Investigation Reports as the amount 
for Board ordered restitution, if an offender 
notifies the Board that he wants to contest that 
restitution, the Board would hold a restitution 
hearing. 
9. Nothing in Mr. Garcia's Board file indicates, 
in the five (5) years he was under the Board's 
jurisdiction, that he ever asked for a restitution 
hearing, or raised the issue of restitution in any 
communication with the Board, until his attorney's 
December 23, 2013, GRAMA requests concerning 
restitution. 
DECLARATION OF GREG JOHNSON, dated 6 February 2014. RECORD 
at 217-218. Emphasis added. 
The Johnson "declaration" is significant: the 
statements in Paragraph 5 imply that it is (was) the Board's 
regular practice to NOT hold the "res ti tut ion hearing", 
unless the prisoner "asked" for it. 
The Board's failure (to conduct the "restitution 
hearing") was correspondingly acknowledged by the Board's 
counsel (Assistant AG Reber) when she- - -attempting to excuse 
and/or explain the Board's failure to hold the restitution 
hearing---wrote: 
As to a res ti tut ion hearing, there was no need 
for a hearing because Defendant had already waived 
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his right to contest the accuracy of the $7000 
amount. The Board ordered the exact amount 
recommended in Defendant's Presentence 
Investigation Report, an amount Defendant failed 
to contest at sentencing, thereby waiving his 
right to subsequently do so. 
Emphasis added. Page 7, Board's OPPOSITION TO "DEFENDANT'S 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
RESTITUTION ORDER memorandum, dated 6 February 2014. [RECORD 
at 161] 
Later in the litigation---but within this same "no 
hearing held" context- - -Assistant Attorney General Reber was 
to write: 
"His failure to object there [in the District 
Court, at sentencing] waived any future challenge, 
which in turn negated any requirement for the 
Board to hold a restitution hearing, ... " [p. 3 
of Board motion] 
Defendant was provided all the due process he 
was entitled to in his criminal case as to his 
restitution obligation. [page 4 of Board motion] 
Emphasis added. Pages 3-4, Board's MOTION TO STRIKE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE "CIVIL JUDGMENT" [LACK OF 
STATUTORILY-REQUIRED HEARING: 77-27-5], dated 16 June 2014 
[hereinafter "Board's STRIKE MOTION"], RECORD at 560-565; 
quoted paragraphs are at RECORD 562 and 563. 
The "Order of Restitution"---"made" and thereafter 
filed by the Board in September 2013---is void ab initio and 
without legal effect for the reason that the Board-prepared 
"Order" was made without the statutorily-required "full 
hearing" (or any "hearing", for that matter), as required by 
Section 77-27-5(1) (c), Utah Code, as a pre-condition to the 
entry of the restitution "order". The resulting "civil 
judgment" arising automatically from the filing of the 
invalid (but nevertheless "filed") "Order of Restitution" is 
correspondingly itself invalid and must be set aside. 
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A 
A "FULL HEARING" MUST BE HELD BEFORE THE BOARD 
MAY "ORDER" THE DEFENDANT TO PAY "RESTITUTION" 
The Board's authority to "order" an incarcerated 
prisoner to pay "restitution" is controlled---and limited---
by statute. Section 77-27-5 (1) (c), Utah Code---in the 
Chapter applicable to the Board of Pardons- - -provides in its 
entirety: 
( c) No res ti tu tion may be ordered, no fine, 
forfeiture, or restitution remitted, no parole, 
pardon, or commutation granted or sentence 
terminated, except after a full hearing before the 
board or the board's appointed examiner in open 
session. Any action taken under this subsection 
other than by a majority of the board shall be 
affirmed by a majority of the board. 
Emphasis added. 
The statutory requirement---
"No restitution may be ordered . .. except after 
a full hearing . .. " [Emphasis added] 
- - - is clear and unambiguous. The statutory text is incapable 
of any other interpretation: a "full hearing" is REQUIRED to 
be held BEFORE "restitution" may be ordered. Indeed, this 
text is not merely a requirement, but is an actual 
LIMITATION, as evidenced by the language 
"No restitution may be ordered . .. except . . II 
Emphasis added. 
The statute [77-27-5(1) (c)J is clear and unambiguous. 
The statute does not provide for any exceptions to its 
requirements, nor for the limitation---i.e. "no restitution 
may be ordered . . . except . . . 11 - - -arising therefrom. The 
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statute doesn't place the burden of "asking for" a 
"restitution hearing" upon the incarcerated prisoner; the 
statutory burden to hold the "full hearing" is placed 
singularly upon the Board. If the Board wants to impose 
"restitution", the Board must first conduct the "full 
hearing" on the issue. Only "after a full hearing" has been 
conducted is the Board statutorily-authorized to "order" any 
"restitution". 
The Board's self-admitted failure to conduct a hearing-
- - let alone the statutorily-prescribed "full hearing" - - -
invalidates its "order of restitution". The "civil judgment" 
arising automatically from the filing thereof is likewise 
invalid and must be set aside. 
B 
THE BOARD'S "EXCUSES" FOR ITS FAILURE 
TO HOLD ANY "RESTITUTION HEARING" ARE UNAVAILING 
As documented above, the Board's disingenuous attempt 
to justify its acknowledged failure to hold the statutorily-
required "restitution hearing" on grounds, none of which is 
identified or recognized in the controlling statute [77-27-
5] : 
1. The Board claims that Defendant GARCIA never 
requested a "restitution hearing" be held. 
2 . The Board claims that Defendant GARCIA had 
"waived" his right to a restitution hearing by 
failing to "object" to the pre- sentence report 
[June 2008] statement that the Utah Office of 
36 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
ATTORNEY Al LAW 
Crime Victim Reparations ["CVR"] had paid $7,000 
for funeral expenses. 
3. The Board claims that Defendant GARCIA had 
"waived" his rights to object to the $7,000 
amount, thus waiving his right to a hearing 
because the Board ordered that exact amount as 
"restitution". 
The Board's arguments---advanced as excuses for its failure 
to hold the II full hearing" - - -are flawed, inaccurate and 
illusory, for numerous reasons, some of which are: 
1. Other than its claimed, self-serving 
"Defendant waived" statements, the Board neither 
identified nor produced (or even suggested) any 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE- - -testimonial or documentary- - -
that such a "waiver" actually occurred, let alone 
was implied or consciously intended. [Given that 
"waiver" of a "constitutional right" (in this case 
"procedural due process" right to the hearing) 
ought to be by clear and convincing evidence, of 
a knowing and intentional result (ala waiver), the 
Board's claimed "waiver" excuse is unavailing.] 
2. The statutory scheme- - -particularly 77-27-
5) ( l) ( c) - - -clearly imposed upon the Board the 
obligation to hold the "full hearing" as a 
prerequisite to Board-ordered "restitution". The 
Defendant is not required to "ask for" a hearing, 
and there is no statutory provision which even 
37 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
A TTORNE'Y AT l"'- W 
suggests such a requirement. 
3 . Contrary t.o the Board's counsel's statement- - -
a material misstatement of fact intentionally made 
to mislead a tribunal---that "restitution had been 
recommended" (paraphrased), there simply was NO 
RECOMMENDATION within the June 2006 "pre-sentence 
report" as to any "restitution" to be "ordered". 
4. The "pre-sentence report" did contain A 
TRUTHFUL STATEMENT: that the Utah Office for Crime 
Victims Reparation ["CVR"] asserted it had paid 
$7, 000 as funeral expenses. The statement was 
truthful on both counts: 1. The CVR Office made 
the statement, and 2. The CVR Office did, in fact, 
make the $7,000 payment. There was no need for 
Defendant GARCIA to "object" to the truthful 
statement; his "failure to object" to an otherwise 
truthful statement cannot be the basis for failing 
to grant the statutorily-required "full hearing" 
to which he was entitled. 
5. Defendant's "failure to object" to the 
otherwise-truthful statement that the CVR Office 
"paid $7,000" in funeral expenses is not a waiver 
of his "right to object" that "restitution" would 
actually be sought and imposed ("ordered") against 
him. The $7,000 amount did correspond to what the 
CVR Office paid two years earlier, but the failure 
to "object" thereto is not a "waiver" of his right 
38 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
(,, 
'-iW 
to contest the IMPOSITION of restitution, even 
though the stated amount was 
6 . GARCIA did, in fact, explain---through 
counsel- - -the "restitution" issue: that the 
"funeral expenses" were the subject of currently-
underway "civil litigation". See TRANSCRIPT OF 2 
JUNE 2008 SENTENCING, pages 9 {line 14-25) and 10 
(lines 1-22). Judge Skanchy accepted that "there 
is a civil case pending" explanation {of Defense 
Counsel Orifici) and ruled that the "restitution" 
issue would be "left open" {Court's terminology} . 
No legitimate "waiver" can come (or reasonably be 
claimed to come} from Defendant's statements and 
the acceptance by the Court---for whom the "pre-
sentence report" was singularly prepared---
thereof. 
7. The Board-claimed "waiver" {as to his right to 
a "full hearing") allegedly arising from GARCIA'S 
11 failure to object" to the otherwise-truthful 
statement in the presentence report is a 
contortion and misreading and misapplication of 
the two statutes [Sections 77-18-1 {6) {b} and 77-
38a-203 (2) {d)] describing the presentence report 
and the effect of a failure to object. 
The Board-identified excuses for its failure to hold 
the II res ti tut ion hearing" - - -and more particularly, the "full 
hearing" required by 77-27-5---are just that: excuses. Those 
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excuses do NOT justify the Board's failure to conduct the 
statutorily-required "full hearing", as a pre-condition to 
the imposition of "restitution" 
Defendant GARCIA acknowledges that Page 5 of the 
"presentence report", under the general heading of "VICTIM 
IMPACT STATEMENT AND RESTITUTION", contained the following 
statement: 
... She [Mrs Buckley] states that regarding 
restitution she did file a civil suit in order for 
Shane's automobile insurance to pay for the 
accident. She states the matter is still pending 
collection from the company and that they have 
asked for an additional **** [Board-redacted 
amount; probably circa $5,000+] which was over the 
amount covered for the funeral expenses by Crime 
Victim Reparations. 
According to the Utah Office of Crime Victims 
Reparations they paid $7,000 for funeral expenses 
in this offense. Reference CVR # 151627 for 
restitution payments. 
Emphasis added. Bracketed material added for clarity. 
Presentence Report, p. 5. [RECORD at 176, ATTACHMENT 5 to 
this BRIEF] The AP&P Investigator who prepared the 
Presentence Report (and/or Mrs Buckley herself) was 
seemingly confused as to the precise nature of the civil 
suit" she filed: her lawsuit was filed against GARCIA, whose 
car was involved. His victim's (i.e. "Shane's") liability 
insurance would not have---and did not---defend GARCIA in 
that "civil suit". 
What is significant, however, about the foregoing 
statements (in the Presentence Report) is the simple fact 
that IF the Board had truly read the Presentence Report 
and/or the prepared (for GARCIA'S 2008 "appeal") and 
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presumptively-available TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING, the Board 
would have been aware of the "civil suit" issue. 
It is significant that this two-paragraph section of 
the pre-sentence report---the location where a 
"recommendation" as to some kind of "restitution" might be 
found---is itself facially devoid of any "recommendation" 
(as to "restitution" or anything else). 
The "RECOMMENDATION" portion of the Presentence Report 
is located on Page 1 thereof and provides, in its entirety: 
It is recommended by the staff of Adult Probation 
and Parole that the defendant is sentenced to 
serve the term at the Utah State Prison as 
prescribed by law. 
Emphasis added. Page 1, Presentence Report. RECORD at 172; 
ATTACHMENT 5 to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF. The foregoing, 
single sentence "recommendation" is the ONLY 
"recommendation" made therein; contrary to the Board's 
patently false and misleading statements (that "restitution 
was recommended" [see, for example, RECORD at 338: 
"Defendant's failure to challenge the accuracy of this 
recommended restitution amount at the time of sentencing 
waived any future challenge." Emphasis added.], NO 
restitution was ever recommended---not on page 1 within the 
"RECOMMENDATION" section and not on page 5 of the 
"RESTITUTION" section of the Presentence Report. There being 
no specific "recommendation" as to "restitution", 
Defendant's claimed (by the Board) "failure to object" is 
illusory and misleading. Defendant clearly did not thus 
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"waive" his right to the "full hearing" or his right to 
"object" to Board-ordered 11 restitution 11 • 
C 
VIOLATION OF BOARD'S OWN 
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS 
In addition to the statutorily-imposed obligations 
(which arguably ought to be "enough 11 ) , the Board has 
violated its own publicly-promulgated (pursuant to the Utah 
Administrative Rule-Making Act) "administrative 
regulations". Regulation R671-403 [entitled "Restitution"], 
in effect in 2010 when the Board, in seeming "Star Chamber" 
fashion and without notice to GARCIA, allegedly (i.e. 
claimed by the Board) "ordered" the restitution against him, 
provides in relevant part: 
... The offender and the victim(s) shall have 
the right to be present at the hearing and present 
evidence in their behalf. 
Emphasis added. Administrative Regulation R671-403.2 
Procedure [2009]. 
The Board appears to be "violating its own rules", 
which rules grant to the prisoner "the right to be present 
at the hearing" and "[the right] to present evidence in 
[his] behalf". That the Board itself characterizes these 
conceptual principles as "rights" further undermines the 
Board's claimed 11 waiver 11 excuse. 
D 
CONSTITUTIONAL "DUE PROCESS" VIOLATION 
In addition to the statutory violations, the Board's 
acknowledged failure to afford Defendant GARCIA the "full 
42 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
hearing"---or any hearing, in that regard---concerning the 
"restitution" issue offends and violates his "due process of 
law" rights guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, the latter of 
which provides: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution. Emphasis added. The 
Board's action---first in considering and then in "ordering" 
Defendant GARCIA to pay the $7,000 in "funeral expenses", 
all without any "notice" to him and/or any "opportunity to 
be heard"----clearly "deprives" GARCIA of his "property"; 
accordingly, 11 due process of law" is constitutionally 
required as a pre-condition to that governmental action. 
There can be no "due process" in any situation undertaken in 
violation of the statutorily-prescribed conditions and 
prerequisites, legislatively-mandated to assure that very 
"due process". 
The minimum requirement for "due process of law" in 
these situations are (1) adequate notice (that potentially-
adverse action against the person is contemplated by the 
government agency) and (2) an opportunity to be heard in a 
meaningful manner (to challenge the intended agency action) . 
Dairy Produce Services, Inc. vs City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 
81, 13 P.3d 581; Miller vs USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, 44 
P.3d 663 (Utah Supreme Court 2002); Wells vs Children's Aid 
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Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah Supreme Court 1984); 
Nelson vs Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah Supreme Court 1983); 
Celebrity Club Inc. vs Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657 
P.2d 1293 (Utah Supreme Court 1982). The order of an 
administrative body issued without notice to affected 
individuals violates due process. Morris vs Public Service 
Commission, 7 Utah 2d 167, 321 P.2d 644 (Utah Supreme Court 
1958). Neither court nor other judicial tribunal may deny 
constitutional right or deprive a person of vested property 
interest without opportunity to be heard. Hailing vs 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 71 Utah 112, 263 Pac. 78 
(Utah Supreme Court 1927). 
E 
THE "G.R.A.M.A. EVIDENCE" AND INFERENCES 
The District Court's "no jurisdiction" ruling 
effectively precluded "pre-trial discovery" to ascertain the 
operative 11 facts 11 as to the Board-ordered "restitution". 
[Actual II discovery" in the II criminal" case was arguably 
minimal at best, given the already-completed status of the 
underlying case.] Defendant GARCIA attempted to utilize the 
G.R.A.M.A. statute to force the Board to disclose these 
relevant "records". GARCIA'S G.R.A.M.A. request (initially 
in December 2013, and follow-up in June 2014) focused upon 
the precise "restitution vote" issue, thus: 
1. Board disclosure of the operative "staff 
recommendation" (or whatever existed) as to the 
specific "restitution" question, upon which the 
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five Boardmernbers were expected to individually 
deliberate, decide and actually "vote". [Without 
actually seeing the precise 11 issue" (or 
"recommendation" or whatever) was physically 
presented to each voting Boardmember, it would be 
impossible to ascertain if the Boardmember 
actually "voted" to "order restitution".] 
2 . Board disclosure of the actual "vote" 
document: the actual piece(s) of paper by which 
the voting Boardmembers---actually, it was 
disclosed there were only three members voting---
actually "voted", that is, communicated their 
affirmative "vote" (to "order" restitution), 
without qualification or condition, to the other 
Boardmembers and/or to the staff, for 
implementation of that decision. [Any 
qualification or condition (as to "ordering" 
restitution] by any of the three "voting" 
Boardmembers would violate the "majority vote" 
requirement of Section 77-27-5(1) (c) .] 
The Board actively and vigorously resisted disclosure of the 
two categories of "restitution vote" records. This "stone-
walling" · approach (undersigned's terminology) was 
inexplicable: one would have thought the Board would want to 
disclose the "hard evidence" of its statutory compliance. 
But the opposite proved to be true: no disclosure, leading 
to the conclusion that there was "something to hide". 
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One would think that the Board---then presently 
involved (as a claimed "real-party-in-interest") in active 
litigation presumably headed "up on appeal" would want to 
disclose its documents which (1) "restitution" was clearly 
and actually "recommended" for the Board's "vote" and (2) 
that the three Boardmembers---but only three---who actually 
voted, did so in an affirmative manner and without 
qualification. That the Board continuously resisted the 
G.R.A.M.A. disclosure leads to the unavoidable inference 
that the undisclosed documents are antagonistic to the 
Board's orally-claimed position. 
The Board's failure to conduct the "full hearing" 
before actually "ordering" the Defendant to make 
"restitution" invalidates the Board's 11 order 11 • The "civil 
judgment" resulting from the "filing" of that statutorily-
defective, constitutionally-defective and administratively-
defective "order of restitution" must be set aside. 
III 
THE BOARD-ORDERED "RESTITUTION" FOR "FUNERAL EXPENSES" 
IS STATUTORILY DEFECTIVE AND INVALID DUE TO THE BOARD'S 
FAILURE TO PROPERLY ADHERE TO THE STATUTORY DEFINITION 
OF "PECUNIARY DAMAGES", WHICH IN THIS CASE FOR TIME-BARRED 
PURSUANT TO APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION FOR 
"WRONGFUL DEATH" CLAIMS 
The single-vehicle accident which resulted in the death 
of Defendant's passenger occurred in March 2006. Defendant 
was convicted of the felony offense in April 2008, but was 
not sentenced until June 2008. [By that time the applicable 
statute of limitation---under 78-12-28 (repealed 2008) 
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and/or 78B-2-304 (2) (adopted 2008) ---had already "run", to 
bar any "wrongful death" claim. Because ·the State "Crime 
Victims Reparation" office had not then (by March 2008) 
filed "wrongful death" litigation against GARCIA on its 
"subrogation" claim, any corresponding "restitution" ordered 
by the Board would have been technically impossible. Even if 
the Board "ordered" the restitution in October 2010---
disputed by Defendant- - -the claim would still have been 
barred.] 
The Board's "authority" to order a prisoner within its 
custody to pay "restitution" is entirely statutory. 
The statute [77-27-6 (2) (b)] provides, in relevant part: 
(2) (b) In accordance with Section 77-38a-
302(5) (d) (ii), the board may order that a 
defendant make restitution for pecuniary damages 
that were not determined by the court, unless the 
board applying the criteria as set forth in 
Section 77-38a-302 determines that restitution is 
inappropriate. 
Emphasis added. 
Subsection 77-38a-102 (6), within the "definitions" 
section of the Crime Victims Restitution Act, "defines" 
"pecuniary damages" thus: 
( 6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable 
economic injury, whether or not incurred, which a 
person could recover in a civil action arising out 
of the facts or events constituting the 
defendant's criminal activities ... 
Emphasis added. 
The statutory "definition" of "pecuniary damages"---
that "definition" being further restricted by statutory 
provisions not applicable here- - -seemingly expansive in 
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scope ( 11 all demonstrable economic injury 11 ) but nevertheless 
includes the restrictive phrase 
11 which a person could recover in a civil action 11 • 
Emphasis added. In the GARCIA setting- - - factually and 
legally---as the 11 restitution 11 issue was before---as claimed 
by the Board, but disputed by GARCIA---the Board of Pardons 
in October 2010, the following facts are 11 operative 11 
even admitted by GARCIA): 
1. Defendant's 11 victim 11 died in March 2006. 
2. The Utah Crime Victims Reparation [ 11 CVR"] 
payment of $7,000 to Mrs Gail Buckley, mother and 
court-designated "personal representative" of the 
deceased' s "probate estate", occurred in September 
2006. 
3 . Defendant was "sentenced" to prison in June 
2008. 
4 . At the earliest, the Board "ordered" 
restitution in October 2010. [Defendant DISPUTES 
the Board's assertion that "restitution" was 
actually "ordered" at that time.] 
(and 
Under "subrogation law" principles, the Crime Victims 
Reparations office payment of $7,000 to the Personal 
Representative for "funeral expenses 11 effectively 
"substituted" the state agency "to stand in the shoes of" 
(undersigned's terminology) that Personal Representative. 
With that September 2006 payment, the State agency acquired-
--at least to the limit of its $7,000 payment---the "right" 
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to bring its own litigation against Defendant GARCIA for the 
"funeral expenses" thus reimbursed to Personal 
Representative Gail Buckley. However, those same legal 
restrictions (for example lack of negligence on Defendant's 
part, comparative negligence by deceased passenger, time-
barred defense under applicable statute of limitation, and 
so forth) which could have been asserted against the 
Personal Representative would nevertheless be available (for 
assertion by Defendant GARCIA) against the State CVR claim. 
Former Section 78-12-28(2)---repealed, renumbered [to 
Section 78B-2-304(2), and reenacted pursuant to the 
Legislature 1 s 2008 recodification of the "Title 78--Judicial 
Code II of the Utah Code, effective 7 February 2 008- - -provided 
in relevant part: 
An action may be brought within two years: 
(2) for recovery of damages for a death 
caused by the wrong act or neglect of 
another; 
Emphasis added. 
These foregoing 11 overlapping 11 ---actually "bookending" 
is perhaps a more accurate terminology- - - "statutes of 
limitation" combine to require that the State Office for 
Crime Victim Reparations [CVR] litigation, under its own 
name and pursuant to its "subrogation" entitlement to do so, 
had to be filed BEFORE the March 2008 2-year deadline; the 
State 1 s litigation simply wasn't filed then, nor at any 
time. 
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Had the Board given---the Board didn't---Defendant 
GARCIA (1) "notice" of its intention to 11 order restitution 11 
and/or (2) the statutorily-required 11 full hearing 11 [77-27-
5 (1) (c)] on the "restitution" issue, the Board would have 
learned from GARCIA of this "defense" thereto. Having failed 
to give GARCIA the 11 full hearing 11 [see Point II, above], the 
Board cannot complain or object to what might have been told 
to it. 
In any event, the fact that the Board was, as a 
minimum, at least four years (or more) 11 late 11 in "ordering" 
the "restitution", prohibits, as a matter of law, the 
underlying validity of its "restitution order": the Board's 
"order" of "restitution", exceeding and outside of the 
statutory "definition" of the 11 pecuniary damages", is an 
ultra vires act. 
The resultant "civil judgment" flowing from the filing 
of the thus-defective "order of restitution" must be set 
aside. 
IV 
THE BOARD-CREATED AND BOARD-FILED "ORDER OF RESTITUTION" 
IS DEFECTIVE AND INVALID, DUE TO ITS UNTIMELY "MAKING" 
WHICH DID NOT OCCUR WITHIN THE STATUTORILY-PRESCRIBED 
PERIOD OF TIME (77-27-6(4): "WITHIN 60 DAYS") 
OF THE PRISONER'S RELEASE FROM CUSTODY; 
THE RESULTANT "CIVIL JUDGMENT" MUST BE SET ASIDE 
The Board-prepared "order of restitution", ostensibly 
"made" as of 24 September 2013 as of its thus stated "date", 
was "forwarded" [statutory term] to the Third District Court 
(as "the sentencing court") on or about 10 October 2013 and 
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thereafter "entered on the judgment docket". The "making" of 
that "restitution order" runs afoul of the "within 60 days" 
(of the prisoner's release) requirement of Section 77-27-
6 ( 4) ; the resultant "civil judgment" arising f ram the 
subsequent "forwarding", "referring" and/or "entry" of the 
facially-defective "order" is defective, improper and must 
be set aside. 
Section 77-27-6(4), Utah Code, applicable to the Board 
and expressly in the context of "restitution" ordered 
against prisoners, provides in relevant part: 
(4) If the defendant, upon termination or 
expiration of the sentence owes outstanding fines, 
restitution, or other assessed costs, or if the 
board makes an order of restitution within 60 days 
after the termination or expiration of the 
defendant's sentence, the matter shall be referred 
to the district court for civil collection 
remedies. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall 
forward a restitution order to be entered on the 
judgment docket. The entry shall constitute a lien 
and is subject to the same rules as a judgment for 
money in a civil judgment. 
Emphasis added. 
Section 77-27-6 (2) (c), Utah Code, reaffirms the 
legislative intent by providing: 
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (2) (d), the 
board shall make all orders of restitution within 
60 days after the termination or expiration of the 
defendant's sentence. 
Emphasis added. The introductory phrasing ("except as 
provided by Subsection (2) (d) ": pertaining to prisoners 
incarcerated for other charges and sentences extending past 
the current sentence) is inapplicable to the GARCIA 
situation. The Subsection (c) says "all orders": no 
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exceptions and no excuses. 
Defendant GARCIA was released from prison on 15 April 
2013. The "within 60 days" time-period expired on or about 
14 June 2013; the Board's "order", "made" as of 24 September 
2013 is months and months "late". The BOARD offered no 
rebuttal "evidence" to show the 24 September 2013 document 
was not created ("made") on that date. 
The statutory word "made" is not confusing or 
ambiguous; the word, in "plain, common everyday English" 
means to create or to bring into existence, perhaps 
composing from pre-existing materials into a composite item. 
In this sense, the word 11 made 11 ---although not frequently the 
subject of "legal" or legislative usage as to describe the 
process (or product) of governmental agency action---is 
straight-forward and precise. In this context, the Board 
(and/or its Chairperson) "made" the "restitution order" 
ostensibly by combining an otherwise blank sheet of paper 
and affixing, in a computer printer, the black "toner 
cartridge toner" thereto. Thereafter, an II ink" signature was 
affixed. The "order" was thus "made" or created or brought 
into existence, as such. 
In the trial court the Board's counsel (Ms Reber) 
attempted to excuse the facially-obvious violation of the 
"within 60 days" (of release) rule by arguing that the 
Board---in October 2010---had "ordered" the restitution and 
thus the situation fell within the first introductory 
phrasing of the first sentence of Subsection 77-27-6(4), 
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pertaining to "If the defendant owes restitution • II 1 SO 
as to avoid the "within 60 days" requirement occurring 
within the second dependent phrase. The Board's argument was 
flawed, for numerous reasons: 
1. The Defendant GARCIA did not "owe 11 - - - then, in 
2010---any "restitution"; none had been "ordered" 
by the District Court. 
2. The Board-ordered "restitution", ostensibly 
arising from its action in October 2010, was 
without the statutorily-required "full hearing" as 
well being also in violation of constitutional 
"due process II standards. See Point I I of this 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
3 . The subrogation claim (for $7,000, for 
"funeral expenses" reimbursed to the victim's 
mother and Personal Representative) was obviously 
time-barred by the applicable statute of 
limitation; the Board's "order" was and/or would 
be ultra vires. See Point III of this APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF. 
The "second" phrase is applicable and controlling for the 
following reasons: 
1. First, the statutory requirement is clear; the 
requirement speaks in terms of "making" an order, 
which will be thereafter "forwarded" and "entered" 
and so forth, to achieve the statutorily-described 
result: the so-called "civil judgment" so entered 
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against Defendant GARCIA. The statute does NOT 
talk about 11 deciding 11 to 11 order 11 the restitution. 
Thus, the 11 date 11 of the actual "making" is 
critical and dispositive; the date of any 
decision-making process (or even the resultant 
decision), even from years earlier, is irrelevant. 
2. Secondly, the Board-created 2010 documents---
the October 7th "INITIAL HEARING" and the 
"correcting" October 13th "HEARING OFFICER 
RESULTS" documents- - -do not themselves claim to be 
an 11 order of restitution". [The "restitution" 
language contained therein is ambiguous and 
arguably confusing: it is arguable whether the 
Board actually decided anything specific as to 
"ordered" restitution, or was merely leaving it up 
to a later "referral" to the District Court. For 
example I the ORIGINAL HEARING document states, 
albeit under the "Hearing Notes" section of the 
document: 
1. Other: The restitution owed of 
$7000.00 on Case # 06-1607 will be 
forwarded to the sentencing Court for a 
Civil Judgement(sic). 
Emphasis added. RECORD at 188; ATTACHMENT 8 to 
this APPELLANT'S BRIEF. There is nothing to 
indicate---particularly to Defendant GARCIA, 
incarcerated and without ready access to legal 
counsel---the Board had thus "ordered" 
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restitution. The phrase II shall be forwarded to the 
sentencing Court for a Civil Judgement (sic)" could 
be readily understood (by GARCIA) that there was 
going to be a new civil case filed against him. 
[See also his bi-weekly "NORMS Statements", which 
continuously and affirmatively indicated, for the 
entirety of his 5-year incarceration, that "zero" 
restitution was owing. RECORD at 383-384; 
ATTACHMENT 11 to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF.] 
The HEARING OFFICER RESULTS document [RECORD 
at 190, ATTACHMENT 9 to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF], 
dated six days later, facially purporting to be a 
"correcting" document for "clerical error", is 
even more vague and ambiguous, by providing in 
relevant part: 
Hearing notes: 
2. Other. The restitution owed will be 
forwarded to the sentencing Court for a 
Civil Judgement(sic). 
Emphasis added. RECORD at 190; ATTACHMENT 9 to 
this APPELLANT'S BRIEF. Again, the written text is 
devoid of any affirmative "indication" that the 
Board has actually "ordered" GARCIA to pay 
"restitution", for which---in this "correcting" 
document---NO "amount" is stated, thus leading to 
additional confusion on GARCIA' s part. The TWO 
October 2010 documents must be compared to and 
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contrasted with the September ·2013 "ORDER OF 
RESTITUTION" which "looks" like an operative 
"ORDER OF RESTITUTION", "forwarded" and so forth. 
3. Similarly, those October 2010 documents were 
NOT "filed" with the District Court; the 24 
September 2013 "order WAS so "forwarded" and 
"entered". IF the 2010 documents were intended and 
then (by the Board) considered to be "restitution 
orders", why were they not actually "filed" as 
such? [Rhetorical question.] As the October 2013 
was so "made" and thereafter "filed" ("forwarded") 
and entered? 
4. That the Board actually "filed" its 24 
September 2013 "restitution order" establishes its 
intentions, then (in 2010) and now: the October 
2010 documents are not "restitution orders" and 
were never intended to be such. 
5. Lastly, and most importantly, it is THE 24 
September 2013 "order" which brings about the 
result complained of in this proceeding. 
Due to the untimely "making" of the Board-filed "order 
of restitution", the resultant "civil judgment" must be set 
aside. 
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THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 77-27-5(3) 
ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATIVE OF THE 
"OPEN COURTS" PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
[ARTICLE I, SECTION 11] 
The State has argued that the provisions of Section 77-
27- 5 ( 3), Utah Code, preclude the Court from reviewing the 
decision of the Board of Pardons in this case. Indeed, the 
provisions of Section 77-27-5(3) are quite clear and 
unambiguous and state in relevant part: 
( 3) Decisions of the board in cases involving 
paroles, pardons, commutations or terminations of 
sentence, restitution, or remission of fines and 
forfeitures are final and are not subject to 
judicial review. 
Emphasis added. 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial 
and unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any 
tribunal in the State, by himself or counsel, any 
civil cause to which he is a party. 
Emphasis added. 
The "open courts" violation is as obvious as the nose 
on one's face: a Board decision (specifically, involving 
"restitution" as in the GARCIA situation) is insulated from 
any and all "judicial review". No if's, and's or but's. The 
"restitution order" wrongfully issued [see Points II, III 
and IV, herein] against GARCIA is certainly an "injury done 
to him in his . . property", but Section 77-27-5(3) 
immunizes the Board (and it's "order") from any and all 
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"judicial review". FOOTNOTE 6 
A 
preservation of issue and standard of review 
The District Court 
"unconstitutionality of 










UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE [77-27-5 (3)] 11 , dated/filed 24 
April 2014. RECORD at 288-289. The Utah Attorney General was 
notified of this "unconstitutionality" challenge to a Utah 
statute pursuant to mailed "Defendant's Notification", dated 
24 April 2014, RECORD at 290-291. 
Notwithstanding the "strong presumption of 
constitutionality" afforded a validly-adopted statute [see 
Maxfield vs Herbert, 2012 UT 44, 115, 284 P.3d 647 (Utah 
Supreme Court 2012) and Peterson vs Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 
42, 1 23, 48 P.3d 941 (Utah Supreme Court 2002), and the 
challenging party's "heavy burden" [Jones vs Utah Board of 
Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, 1 10, 94 P. 3d 283 (Utah 
Supreme Court 2004)], Defendant GARCIA accepts that 
challenge. 
6Although not involving the "unconstitutionality" of 
Section 77-27-5(3) per se, the Board 1 s action in imposing 
"restitution"---ostensibly following the 5 October 2010 
11 initial hearing", but without notice to or participation by 
GARCIA, for a civil claim ("pecuniary damages") which were 
clearly time-barred and for which the Board was "late" in 
"making" (statutory term) its "order of restitution" - - -
violates the "no person shall be barred from . . . defending 
before any tribunal" requirement contained in the latter 
half of Article I, Section 11. 
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B 
Defendant's "standing" and parties 
Defendant-Appellant GARCIA is the subject of a "civil 
judgment" (for $7,000) for "restitution", arising from the 
administrative decision of the Utah Board of Pardons and 
Parole. In that capacity, he certainly has "standing" to 
raise the "unconstitutionality" challenge to the statute 
relied upon by the Board is "defending" its decision and/or 
seeking to deny GARCIA' s claims, certainly in the 
"restitution" context in which he is involved. 
The UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, a Utah state 
government agency, in January 2014 petitioned the District 
Court for "voluntary intervention" in this case: to "defend" 
the "restitution order" the Board made and caused to be 
"entered" against GARCIA. The Board---represented by legal 
counsel from the Office of Utah Attorney General---is a 
proper party to "defend" the statute. [Although "notified" 
of Defendant's "unconstitutionality motion" in the District 
Court, the Utah Attorney General did not personally appear 
in the case, but rather allowed the staff attorneys (ala Ms 
Reber) assigned to the Board to defend. 
C 
unconstitutionality under Foote (1991) 
The facial "unconstitutionality" of Section 77-27-5 (3) -
--which, without exception or limitation, effectively denies 
and prohibits all "judicial review" of Board decisions 
across the whole "range" ( of Board decisions) - - - is obvious: 
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the statute clearly violates the "open courts" provisions of 
the Utah Constitution, as contained in Article I, Section 11 
thereof. 
In Foote vs Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1991), an "habeas corpus" case filed to 
challenge Parole Board decisions (for parole, not granted) 
after an unsuccessful "Anders brief appeal" the defendant's 
original criminal conviction, the Utah Supreme Court was 
called upon to discuss---and did so---the so-called 
"collateral attack". Concerning the petitioner's claims (for 
habeas corpus relief) and the provisions of Section 77-27-
5(3), the Utah Supreme Court wrote: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 (3) provides that 
determinations and decisions of the board of 
pardons in cases involving the approval or denial 
of paroles are final and not subject to judicial 
review. Thus there is no right of appeal from a 
decision of the board of pardons. Since an appeal 
is barred by this provision, and since an appeal 
is the only legal remedy that could exist in this 
case, it follows that no remedy at law exists. 
However, if section 77-27-5(3) was intended to 
preclude all judicial review, both by way of law 
and by way of extraordinary writs, then that 
section runs afoul of article I, section 11 of the 
Utah Constitution. [Footnote to Dunn v. Cook, 791 
P.2d 873 (Utah 1990)] 
808 P.2d at 735. 
Al though in Foote the Utah Supreme Court did not 
invalidate (as unconstitutional) Section 77-27-5(3)---
probably because the "habeas corpus" proceeding had not 
expressly sought such relief---the Supreme Court 
nevertheless could not have been more clear in its opinion. 
Indeed, it would seem obvious to all that any statute which 
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precluded "judicial review" of the administrative agency 
would "run afoul" of the "open courts" provisions of the 
Utah Constitution [Article I, Section 11] . In any event, the 
Utah Supreme Court ignored the obviously-unconstitutional 
statutory provision and proceeded to consider (and 
implicitly grant) the sought-for habeas corpus relief, at 
least to remand to a district court for evidentiary hearing 
on the petitioner's claims. 
The provisions of Section 77-27-5 (3) are clear and 
unambiguous: no alternative interpretation can be adopted or 
developed, to avoid the "unconstitutional" result that the 
Legislature has intended. [While the "intent" of the 
Legislature may be understandable, even laudable, the 
blanket prohibition against any and all "judicial review" is 
the statute's fatal "Achilles' heel 11 from which there is no 
survival. J The statute clearly offends the "open courts" 
provisions of the Utah Constitution, contained in Article I, 
Section 11. Clearly, the Defendant's "constitutional right" 
to keep and maintain "property" and/or to not be deprived 
thereof "without due process of law" [Article I, Section 7] 
are valuable rights; violations- - -or alleged violations- - -of 
such rights must be subject to judicial review. On this 
point, the Foote opinion noted: 
In addition, the mandate of the due process 
clause of article I, section 7 of the Declaration 
of Rights in the Utah Constitution is 
comprehensive in its application to all activities 
of state government. It is the province of the 
judiciary to assure that a claim of the denial of 
due process by an arm of government be heard and, 
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if justified, that it be vindicated. What may 
constitute due process in any given circumstance 
may vary, but assuredly, the parole board is not 
outside the constitutional mandate that the 
actions of government must afford due process of 
law. 
808 P.2d at 735. Emphasis added. 
Indeed, the obvious thrust of the Statute is to 
preclude, without exception, any and all recourse to 
"judicial review" of Board actions and decisions. 
In the instant setting, the Court has no convenient 
alternative by which to side-step this important issue: the 
Defendant---clearly having 11 standing 11 to make the claim---
has asserted the "unconstitutionality" of the Statute. 
Indeed, given the "habeas corpus relief is allowed" (in 
spite of the Statute's provisions to the contrary) result in 
Foote, the Utah Supreme Court might be deemed to have 
implicitly determined the Statute to be unconstitutional, 
without explicitly saying so. In the instant situation, the 
Court of Appeals would be following the implicit "precedent" 
established by the Utah Supreme Court in Foote. 
D 
Unconstitutionality of Section 77-27-5(3) 
under Berry vs Beech Aircraft analysis 
In Berry vs Beech Aircraft Corporation, 717 P.2d 670 
(Utah Supreme Court 1985), the Utah Supreme Court determined 
that the Utah Products Liability statute of repose---
requiring tort litigation to be brought six years after the 
product's first use or ten years after manufacture---to be 
unconstitutional, as violative of "open courts" provision. 
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In Horton vs Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1989), the Utah Supreme Court held the Utah 
"architects and builders statute of repose" violated the 
"open courts" provision of Utah Constitution in that it does 
not provide injured persons with effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy for vindication of his or her 
constitutional interest. The Court found the elimination of 
cause of action was an arbitrary and unreasonable means of 
achieving statutory objective of limiting stale claims and 
protecting construction industry. The Goldminer's Daughter 
majority, described the two-part test adopted in Berry vs 
Beech Aircraft and wrote: 
Berry established the following two-part test 
to determine whether a statute that limits one's 
right to remedy by due course of law for injury to 
one's "person, property, or reputation" violates 
Article I, section 11: 
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law 
provides an injured person an effective 
and reasonable alternative remedy "by due 
course of law" for vindication of his 
constitutional interest. 
Second, if there is no substitute or 
alternative remedy provided, abrogation 
of the remedy or cause of action may be 
justified only if there is a clear social 
or economic evil to be eliminated and the 
elimination of an existing legal remedy 
is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means 
for achieving the objective. 
717 P.2d at 680. 
In the instant situation, Defendant GARCIA has been 
Board-ordered to pay $7,000 in restitution which---as 
described in Points II, III, IV and V, above---he should not 
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have been so ordered. Section 77-27-5 (3) clearly is "a 
statute that limits one's right to remedy by due course of 
law for injury to one's . property" (Gold.miner's 
Daughter, supra): the Statute (77-27-5(3)] bars ALL 
"judicial review" of a Board "decision" for "restitution" 
(in GARCIA' s case) and a lot of other cases (for other 
similarly-situated persons). Applying the Berry vs Beech 
Aircraft standards to Section 77-27-5(3): 
The II first II standard- - -does the statute 
provide an "effective and reasonable alternative 
remedy "by due course of law" for vindication of 
his constitutional interest?---cannot be 
satisfied. Section 77-27-5(3) is absolute in its 
terms: judicial review of Board decisions is 
prohibited in all cases. No alternative remedy is 
allowed. 
The statute's failure under the first standard 
invokes the "second" standard: namely, "abrogation 
of the remedy (i.e. judicial review of Board 
decisions) may be justified only if there is a 
clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and 
the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not 
an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving 
that objective." The Legislature, in enacting 77-
27-5(3), has identified no "clear social or 
economic evil to be eliminated" if there were to 
be the proscribed II judicial review" of Board 
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decisions. Nor has the Legislature attempted to 
"narrow" the scope of the prohibition . 
Having "judicial review" of Board decisions is not "a 
clear social or economic evil"; the Board is subject to the 
law just like every other agency of State government. See 
quotation from Foote, in Point v-c, above [page 55]. 
In Goldminer's Daughter the Supreme Court noted that 
the Legislature in enacting the applicable statute of 
limitation (barring the claim) had identified no "clear 
social or economic evil". 
The following decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and 
the principles of law contained therein describing the II open 
courts" provisions are applicable to the situation-at-hand. 
Day vs State ex rel Utah Department of Public Safety, 1999 
UT 46, 980 P. 2d 1171 (Utah Supreme Court 1999) [governmental 
immunity statute barring claim for injuries arising from 
police vehicle chases violates open courts provision] ; 
Julian vs State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah Supreme Court 1998) 
[attempted application of catch-all 4-year statute of 
limitation to habeas corpus proceedings violates "open 
courts II provisions of constitution] ; Currier vs Holden, 862 
P.2d 1357 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993), certiorari denied 
870 P.2d 957 [three-month statute of limitation for habeas 
corpus relief was unconstitutional as violating "open 
courts" provisions]; Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, 
Incorporated vs Herm Hughes & Son, Incorporated, 782 P. d 188 
(Utah Supreme Court 1989) [architects and builders statute 
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of repose violates "open courts" provisions]; Lee vs Gaufin, 
867 P.2d 572 (Utah 19 93) [holding unconstitutional 
legislative abrogation of remedies based on economic and 
social problems that had occurred in other states but not in 
Utah]. 
The above-referenced 11 statute of limitation" cases 
(e.g. Berry, Goldminer's Daughter, Sun Valley Water Beds, 
Julian, Day and others) are, in principle, applicable to the 
"no judicial review" (of Board decisions) statutes: if the 
"statute of limitations" statutes, restricting the impacted 
person by limiting that person's access to judicial remedy, 
are violative of the "open courts" guarantee, then Section 
77-27-5(3)---which in all cases and for all time, prohibits 
any and all "judicial review"---must certainly violate the 
"open courts" provision. The Utah Supreme Court in Foote 
readily observed as much, but had not been asked for the 
"unconstitutionality" determination. GARCIA is asking for it 
now. 
That there are other cases---numerous cases, even (e.g 
Julian, Currier and others)---which have ignored the clear 
prohibitions (i.e. "no judicial review") of 77-27-5(3) is 
not an indication of an alternative interpretation of the 
statutory text; there can be no other meaning than that so 
clearly stated. That other cases may have avoided 
confronting the "unconstitutionality" issue---because those 
appellate courts were not expressly requested to do so---is 
not evidence of the statutes validity. On the contrary, that 
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the appellate courts have "skirted the issue" is an implicit 
recognition of the statute's invalidity. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court does have "jurisdiction" - - -even 
"civil" jurisdiction---over the Board-ordered 11 restitution 11 , 
as such "jurisdiction" arises, pursuant to statute, by 
reason of the Board's "forwarding" and "referring" its 
"restitution order" to the District Court, which "order" was 
thereafter "entered on the judgment docket". The District 
Court's "jurisdiction" includes Rule 60 (b) remedies to "set 
aside" the resultant "civil judgment" entered against 
Defendant GARCIA. 
The Board admits that it failed---prior to "ordering" 
the Defendant's "restitution"---to conduct any "restitution 
hearing". This failure falls far short of the statutory [77-
27-5 (3)] requirement and limitation: namely, that "no 
restitution may be ordered ... except after a full hearing 
... ". No hearing---let alone the "full hearing"---having 
been first conducted, the "order of restitution" was 
improperly "made" and the "civil judgment" resulting from 
the filing of that "order" must be set aside. 
The Board's claimed justifications- - -the Defendant 
didn't "request" a hearing and/or the Defendant thus 
"waived" his hearing by failing to object to the truthful 
statement of fact [namely, that "CVR claimed to have paid 
$7000 11 (paraphrased)] within the presentence report---are 
inadequate reasons for the Board's failure to follow the 
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statutory requirements directly applicable hereto. 
The Board's decision to 11 order 11 restitution---even if 
made as early as October 2010 (albeit without the 
statutorily-required "full hearing" - - -is nevertheless 
invalid and ultra vires. The Board is allowed to "order 
restitution" only for "pecuniary damages", which are further 
defined as what a person "might recover in a civil action" . 
The $7,000 "funeral expenses"---ostensibly incurred and/or 
paid in March 2006 (at time of death)---were time-barred by 
the two-year statute of limitation (for "wrongful death") of 
Section 7 8 B - 2 - 3 0 4 ( 2 ) , Utah Code . Thus , no " restitution" 
could have been ordered therefor. The "civil judgment" must 
be set aside. 
The Board-filed "order of restitution" was untimely 
"made", as not occurring "within 60 days" of the expiration 
of GARCIA' s sentence of incarceration. The resulting "civil 
judgment" arising from the "entry" of that "order" must be 
set aside. 
The Statute (Section 77-27-5(3), Utah Code) is clear 
and unequivocal in its direction, intent and scope: ALL 
"judicial review" of Board decisions is prohibited. There 
are NO exceptions. That some case law decisions have 
overlooked the otherwise all-encompassing provisions of the 
statute does not validate the statute; those cases did not 
involve a direct attack upon the statute's 
"unconstitutionality", upon which the decisions made no 
direct ruling. In fact, that the former courts ignored the 
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statutory prohibitions is evidence of that same 
unconstitutionality, even if the courts didn't say so. But 
Foote did expressly say so, even if in a II dicta II manner. The 
all-encompassing prohibition against "judicial review" 
embodied with 77-27-5 (3) flies in the face of the "open 
courts" provisions of Article I, Section 11. The Court 
should make that judicial determination, as so 11 moved 11 by 
Defendant GARCIA. 
The Court of Appeals must decide the II jurisdiction" 
issue: if only to advise District Courts and the Board of 
the requirements of the law on that narrow question. 
The Court of Appeals should decide the "on-the-merits" 
substantive issues raised---lack of "full hearing", time-
barred "funeral expenses", and untimely "made" restitution 
order---to avoid GARCIA from the continuing and lingering 
effects of the undeserved "civil judgment" entered against 
him: future execution and/or garnishment, as well as adverse 
"credit report" which seriously affects job potential and 
housing opportunities. The identified issues should be 
decided to authoritatively avoid future situations (and 
appeals) which may result from similar actions by the Board, 
taken against similarly-undeserving persons (e.g. on parole 
or awaiting parole) who may not be in a position to 
meaningfully challenge such illegal actions. The Court of 
Appeals should remand the case back to the District Court 
for entry of judgment in accordance with its decision. 
The Court of Appeals 
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must decide the 
"unconstitutionality'' question: Defendant GARCIA has 
"standing", is economically threatened by invocation of the 
statute, and has made a more-than-adequate demonstration of 
the statute's "unconstitutionality", which has already 
(Foote) been already been judicially recognized. 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
["BAD FAITH" LITIGATION: Section 78B-5-825, Utah Code] 
The Board's admitted failure to hold the statutorily-
required II full hearing" as a prerequisite and in 
contradiction to its own publicly-promulgated 
"administrative regulations" and notions of constitutional 
"procedural due process" standards, its "restitution order" 
for pecuniary damages which were facially time-barred and 
thus ultra vires, and its 11 filing 11 of an "order" was 
statutorily 11 late 11 in its making but nevertheless thus 
creating an immediately-enforceable "civil judgment" upon an 
undeserving person, have each worked to cause Defendant 
GARCIA significant attorney's fees to set aside the 
"restitution order". Coupled with the Board's "no 
jurisdiction" assertions to the District Court and the 
resulting necessary appeal thereof, those actions constitute 
"bad faith litigation" for which Defendant seeks and should 
be awarded reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Section 
78B-5-825, Utah Code. 
APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Defendant-Appellant GARCIA requests that the Utah Court 
70 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
of Appeals grant "oral argument" prior to considering and 
adjudging this appeal. 
COUNSEL'S CERTIFICATION ["WORD COUNT" AND TYPE SIZE] 
The undersigned counsel certifies that the text and 
footnotes within the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF were 
printed in 13-point Courier type (font) and that the "word 
count" for the BRIEF- - -exclusive of Table of Contents, Table 
of Authorities and Rule-required quotations within 
"Constitutional and Statutory Provisions"---was 13,483 
words, as indicated by the "word count" subroutine of the 
WordPerfect 5 .1 word-processing system upon which the typed 
material was created. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of March, 2015. 
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71 
STEPHEN G HOMER 




Board-prepared "ORDER OF RESTITUTION" 
[prepared 24 September 2013 ; filed 10 October 2013) 
RECORD at 119 
ATTACHMENT 2 
District Court "MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER" 
[11 April 2014) 
RECORD at 279-282 
ATTACHMENT 3 
District Court "MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER" 
[21 August 2014) 
RECORD at 593-596 
ATTACHMENT 4 
"ORDER OF THE COURT" [Final Judgment] 
[29 September 2014) 
RECORD at 604-607 
ATTACHMENT 5 
Excerpts from May 2008 PRESENTENCE REPORT [pp . 1, 5) 
RECORD at 172, 176 
ATTACHMENT 6 
"Docket History" Gail Buckley vs Dennis Joseph Garcia 
Third Judicial District Court, Civil No . 080903244 
ATTACHMENT 7 
June 2008 "General Release and Settlement Agreement" 
Gail Buckley vs Dennis Joseph Garcia 
Third Judicial District Court, Civil No . 080903244 
RECORD at 385 - 387 
ATTACHMENT 8 
Board-prepared "ORIGINAL HEARING" document 
[7 October 2010) 
RECORD at 188 
ATTACHMENT 9 
Board-prepared "HEARING OFFICER RESULTS" document 
[13 October 2010) 
RECORD at 190 
ATTACHMENT 10 
Board' s May 2011 "Letter" to Garcia relatives 
RECORD at 192 
ATTACHMENT 11 
Corrections Department-prepared "NORMS Statements" 
[13 June 2008; 31 March 2013) 
RECORD at 383 , 386 
73 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
Third District-Salt Lake 
vs 
Dennis Garcia (OFF# 184816) 
Defendant 
ORDER OF RESTITUTION 
Salt Lake County 
Case Number: 061901607 -
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-27-6(4), the Board of Pardons and Parole 
has determined that the above-entitled Defendant owes restitution. The Defendant should 
make payments as follows: 
Pay restitution in the amount of $7,000.00 to UOVC 
When entered on the Courts Docket, this Order shall constitute a lien against the 
Defendant and is subject to the Rules that apply in any Civil Judgment. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 24th day of September 2013 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE RESTITUTION 
yj) Plaintiff, ORDER 
vs. CASE NO. 061901607 
DENNIS GARCIA, 
Defendant. Judge Randall N. Skanchy 
On March 24, 2014, the Court had before it defendant Dennis Garcia's 
("Mr. Garcia") Motion to Set Aside the Restitution Order from the Utah 
Board of Pardons and Parole ("Board"). Mr. Garcia was represented by 
Stephen Homer, and the Board was represented by Sharel Reber and Amanda 
Jex. The matter was fully briefed by the parties, argument was made, and 
the matter is now ready for decision. 
Factual Background 
Mr. Garcia was convicted of Automobile Homicide, a third degree 
felony, by a jury on April 17, 2008, and was sentenced on June 2, 2008 
to an indeterminate term not to exceed five years at the Utah State 
Prison. On the date of Mr. Garcia's sentence the issue of restitution 
was left open. Ultimately, the Court never determined the amount of 
restitution owed by Mr. Garcia, within one year of Mr. Garcia's 
sentencing date. 
ATTACHMENT 2 
Page 1 of 4 pages 279 
STATE V. GARCIA PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Mr. Garcia's Presentence Report, dated May 28, 2008, under section 
"Victim Impact Statement and iestitution,, reads "(a]ccording· to the Utah 
Office of Crime Victim Reparations they paid $7,000 for funeral expenses 
in this offense," whi~h information was available to Mr. Garcia and his 
counsel at the time of sentencing. (Presentence Report, p. 5.) At Mr. 
Garcia's original Board hearing, on October 5, 2010, a Board hearing 
officer informed Mr. Garcia as to restitution " ... I know there's seven 
thousand dollars was paid by a state agency for funeral costs .... " 
(Hearing Transcript, p. 6. ) The Board's "Original Hearing," dated 
October 7, 2010 thereby ordered "[t]he restitution owed of $7,000.00 on 
Case # 06-107 will be forwarded to the sentencing Court for a Civil 
Judgment." (Original Hearing.) Mr. Garcia's sentence expired on April 
13, 2013. (Hearing Officer Results.) Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-
27-6(4), on September 24, 2013 the Board entered an "Order of 
Restitution" indicating Mr. Garcia still owed $7,000 in restitution 
payable to uovc. 
Discussion 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (5) (d) (i), "[e] xcept as 
provided in Subsection (5) (d) (ii) ... the Court shall make all restitution 
orders at the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year 
after sentencing." At the time Mr. Garcia was sentenced on June 2, 2008 
this Court left the issue of restitution open. Ultimately, the Court 
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never determined the amount of restitution and Mr. Garcia entered the 
Utah Prison under the direction of the Board. 
Utah Code Ann., Subsection (5) (d) (ii), provides that "[a]ny 
pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one 
year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons· and· 
Parole." Utah courts have long recognized that ''Once a court imposes a 
valid sentence, it loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case." 
State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Vaughn, 
201i UT App 411, ~ 11, 266 P.3d 202. This Court entered a valid sentence 
in this case, and thereby lost subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, 
once the one-year period after sentencing expired, this Court also lost 
jurisdiction over Mr. Garcia's restitution obligation. 
moved to the Board to determine restitution owed. 
Jurisdiction 
The Court hereby concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to set aside 
the Board's claim for restitution against Mr. Garcia. The Board's claim 
for restitution is not subject to judicial review by this Court. The 
Court imposed a prison sentence on June 2, 2008, thereby losing subject 
matter jurisdiction. Once the one-year period after sentencing by this 
Court expired, this Court further lost jurisdiction over Mr. Garcia's 
restitution obligation. Jurisdiction moved to the Board at the 
expiration of the Court's jurisdiction over restitution. 
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Accordingly, Mr. Garcia's Motion to Set Aside Restitution is denied. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 061901607 
vs. 
DENNIS J. GARCIA, Judge Randall N. Skanchy 
Defendant. 
This matter came before the Court on Mr. Dennis Garcia's ("Mr. 
Garcia") Motion for New Trial; Motion to Set Aside Civil Judgment; and 
Motion for Judicial Determination of Unconstitutionality. Oral argument 
was held August 11, 2014. The motions are ready for decision. 
Discussion 
Mr. Garcia was sentenced to 0-5 years in prison on June 2, 2008. 
The Court left open the issue of restitution. Mr. Garcia's sentence 
expired April 15, 2013. On September 24, 2013, the Board of Pardons 
entered an Order of Restitution for $7,000 to the Utah Office of Victims 
of Crime to cover the costs of the funeral expenses for Garcia's victim. 
The Court entered the Order on October 10. 
Mr. Garcia sought to set aside the Order of Restitution. The 
Court's Memorandum Decision of April 11, 2014 concluded that the trial 
court does not have jurisdiction over this matter; rather, jurisdiction 
was properly with the Board of Pardons. See State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 
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676, 679 (Utah App. 1991) ("Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it 
loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case"). 
Mr. Garcia now re-raises his arguments in a series of similar 
motions: Motion for Ne~ Trial, Motion to Set Aside Civil Judgment, and 
Motion for Judicial Determination of Unconstitutionality. 1 He asks the' 
Court to reconsider its April 11 decision; set aside the Order of 
Restitution; order a new trial for error of law under Rule 59, U.R.C.P; 
and relieve him from the Judgment under Rule 60, for mistake, fraud, and 
a void Judgment. 
Mr. Garcia reiterates his previous argument that the trial court 
maintains jurisdiction (concurrent with the Board of Pardons) over this 
matter because (i) an Order of Restitution is a legal Judgment, Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-38a-401(4), and the trial court's entry of the Order restores 
its jurisdiction over the matter, and (b) the Utah Supreme Court has 
irnplici tly held that the trial court has unending jurisdiction after 
sentencing. State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, 214 P.3d 104. 
The Court reiterates its prior determination that it has been 
divested of jurisdiction. Mr. Garcia's rehash of his prior arguments 
adds no persuasive authority to change the Court's decision. As for the 
Laycock case, at first blush, Mr. Garcia is correct: Laycock allowed the 
1The State filed a Motion to Strike, noting that Mr. Garcia's motions are duplicative and 
redundant. The State is correct, but the Court opts to treat the Motions together as they 
significantly overlap. The Motion to Strike is denied. 
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trial court to issue an order of restitution beyond the one-year date 
from sentencing, contrary to§ 77-38a-302{5) (d)'s provision ·that after 
the one-year mark, any issue of restitution goes to the Board of Pardons; 
Mr. Garcia suggests L~ycock stands for the premise that the provision 
does not divest the Court of authority over restitution. Mr. Garcia is' 
incorrect; the statute did not include the one-year rule when Laycock was 
rendered, thus negating Garcia's reliance on that case. 
Because the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, the 
Court may not entertain Mr. Garcia's additional arguments that (a) the 
Order of Restitution is void for being served beyond the 60-day rule, 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-6 (4), (b) the Order of Restitution is barred by 
the statute of limitations, and (c) the Order of Restitution is void as 
based on an unconstitutional statute. 
Because this ~ourt lost jurisdiction over this criminal matter, Mr. 
Garcia is not entitled to the relief he is seeking in this case. His 
motions are denied. The Court directs counsel for the State to prepare 
an Order consistent with this decision. 
Dated this 2,1 day of August, 2014. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I emailed/mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision and Order, to the following, this 
-1.---
..;)l day of August, 2014; 
Sharel S. Reber 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Utah Board of Pardons 
P.O. Box 140812 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0812 
Stephen G. Homer 
Attorney for Defendant 
2877 West 9150 South 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
shomerlaw@netzero.com 
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The Order of Court is stat~dbelow: _/;-·' '-('\ 
Dated: September 29, 2014 Isl Randal-; ;_ i 
07:15:25AM Distric': · "l 
-:-~:-~!)~1c1 /\- .,,~11!9 
·•::r,:-~~'~'~tt· 
SHAREL S. REBER (#7966) 
Assistant Attorney General 
SEAN D. REYES (#7969) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Utah Board of Pardons 
PO Box 140812 
160 East 300 South 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0812 
Telephone: (801) 366-0216-
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENNIS J. GARCIA, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF THE COURT 
Case No. 061901607 
Judge: Randall N. Skanchy 
A hearing on Mr. Garcia's Motion for a New Trial, Motion to Set Aside Civil Judgment, 
and Motion for Judicial Determination of Unconstitutionality was held August 11, 2014, before 
the Honorable Randall N. Skanchy. Mr. Garcia was represented by his legal counsel, Stephen G. 
Homer, and the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole (Board) was represented by its counsel, 
Assistant Attorney General, Share) S. Reber. 
Having carefully reviewed all the pleadings submitted by both parties, having heard oral 
September 29, 2014 07:15 AM 
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argument from both parties, having taken the matter under advisement to further consider the 
legal authorities cited by both parties and the oral argument presented by the parties, being fully 
advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters the following: 
BACKGROUND 
Mr. Garcia was sentenced to 0-5 years in prison on June 2, 2008, with the Court leaving 
open the issue of restitution. Mr. Garcia's sentence expired April 15, 2013, and on September 
24, 2013, the Board entered an Order of Restitution for $7,000 to the Utah Office of Victims of 
Crime for the costs of the funeral expenses for Garcia's victim. The Court entered that Order on 
October I 0, 2013. 
Mr. Garcia sought to set aside the Order of Restitution, but in the Court's Memorandum 
Decision of April 11, 2014, the Court concluded that the trial court does not have jurisdiction 
over this matter; rather, jurisdiction was properly with the Board. See State v. Montoya, 825 
P.2d 676, 679 (Utah App. 1991) ("Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses subject matter 
jurisdiction over the case"). 
Mr. Garcia re-raised his arguments in a series of similar motions: Motion for New Trial; 
Motion to Set Aside Civil Judgment; and Motion for Judicial Determination of 
Unconstitutionality. He asked the Court to reconsider its April 11 decision, set aside the Order 
of Restitution, order a new trial for error oflaw under Rule 59, U.R.C.P, and relieve him from 
the Judgment under Rule 60, U.R.C.P, for mistake, fraud, and a void Judgme.nt. 
ORDER OF THE COURT 
Mr. Garcia reiterated his previous argument that the trial court maintains jurisdiction 
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( concurrent with the Board) over this matter because (a) an Order of Restitution is a legal 
Judgment, Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-401(4), and the trial court's entry of the Order restores its 
jurisdiction over the matter, and {b) the Utah Supreme Court has implicitly held that the trial 
court has unending jurisdiction after sentencing. State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53,214 P.3d 104. 
The Court reiterates i-ts prior determination that it has been divested of jurisdiction. Mr. 
Garcia's rehash of his prior arguments adds no persuasive authority to change the Court's 
decision. Addressing the Laycock case, at first blush, Mr. Garcia is correct: Laycock allowed 
the trial court to issue an order of restitution beyond the one-year date from sentencing, contrary 
to § 77-38a-302(5)(d)'s provision that after the one-year mark, any issue of restitution goes to the 
Board. Mr. Garcia suggests Laycock stands for the premise that the provision does not divest the 
Court of authority over restitution. Mr. Garcia is incorrect; the statute did not include the one-
year rule when Laycock was rendered, thus negating Garcia's reliance on that case. 
Because the Couri does not have subject matter jurisdiction, the Court may not entertain 
Mr. Garcia's additional arguments that (a) the Order of Restitution is void for being served 
beyond the 60-day rule, Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-6(4), (b) the Order of Restitution is barred by 
the statute of limitations, and (c) the Order of Restitution is void as based on an unconstitutional 
statute. 
Because this Court lost jurisdiction over this criminal matter, Mr. Garcia is not entitled to 
the relief he is seeking in this case. His motions are denied. This is the final order of the Court; 
no further order is required. This is the end of the Order of the Court in this matter, and the 
Court's signature and seal appear at the top of this Order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing "ORDER OF THE 
COURT" postage prepaid, on this 28th day of August, 2014, to the foliowing: 
Stephen G. Homer 
Attorney for Defendant 
2877 West 9150 South 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
Jacob Franklin 
Attorney for Utah Office of State Debt Collection 
State Office Building 
Box I 001 
Salt Lake City 94114-1001 
September 29, 2014 07:15 AM 
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STATE OF UTAH 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
· SALTLAKEA.P.&P. 
36 W FREMONT A VE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 239-2244 
PRESENTENCE REPORT 
Date Due: 05/28/2008 
Sentencing Date: 06/02/2008 
JUDGE RANDALL SKANCHY1 3RD DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY COURT 
SALT LAKE CITY SALT LAKE UT AH 
- ------------- ---------(CITY) (COUNTY) 






GARC[A, DENNIS JOSEPH 




















It is respectfully recommended by the staff of Adult Probation and Parole that the defendant is sentenced to 
serve the term at the Utah State Prison as prescribed by law. 
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DENNIS JOSEPH GARCIA 
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT AND RESTITUTION: 
Telephone contact was made with the deceaseu··-rc.10ther, !I & ft.$ Mrs. •••plans to be present for 
sentencing, but is unsure at this time if she will wish to speak to the Court. Mrs. ••• states that she feels it 
was evident during testimony that the defendant had no other concern other than for himself and made no 
attempt after the accident to obtain medical assistance for .... She states that regarding restitution she did 
file a civil suit in order for Shane's automobile insurance to pay for the accident. She states the matter is still 
pending collection from the company and that they have asked for an additional ••• which was over the 
amount covered for the funeral expenses by Crime Victim Reparations. 
According to the Utah Office of Crime Victim Reparations they paid $7,000 for funeral expenses in this 
offense. Reference CVR# 151627 for restitution payments. 
DEFENDANT'S LIFE HISTORY AND CURRENT LIVING SITUATION: 
The defendant was born in Utah and is the yowigest of four children born to - and . He 
reports having a normal/close family having excellent relationships with his parents and no particular problems 
other than both parents are <lea£ He states it was a problem when he was younger as he felt oilier people ma4e 
fun and took advantage of his deaf parents. He feels he had a good childhood and his parents did· a good job 
raising their family he had everything he could wish for as a child. In June 1998 the defendant married his 
longtime girlfriend, d . They have three children together. who boin before they were legally married. 
Since their divorce in 2002 he feels they have maintained a "rocky" relationship. The defendant is not 
romantically involved with anyone at present and has recently felt he should try to work thing·s out with his ex-
wife. He reports that around 2004 be started hanging out with the "wrong crowd." Since this accidentthough, 
he has quit drinking and using illegal drugs. He reporls that God has become a major part of his life and he's 
realized how precious life is and how much, God, his children, his family and a couple good friends really mean 
to him. The defendant was living with hi~ parents in their •••lllhome before his incarceration .. 
EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION: 
The defendant attended . through the tenth grade, but finished with his diploma from 
.. & iJbit an alternative school in 1992. He has received some· advance ·sign language training since 
graduation and is interested in going to school to become a sign language interpreter. He reports he knows sign 
language now as it was the primacy language in his home while growing up. The defendant has worked in 
various jobs including_ customer service and construction work. Prior to this offense he was working 
construction but suffered injuries in this accident and could no longer do the work. Prior to coming to jail in 
April 2008 he was working as a Customer Service Representative part time for an internet coaching business 
out of . The defendant has some past due bills for child supp0f4 rent and personal loans from 
family members. Since this offense he feels he has gotten himself "buried in debt." 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL BUCKLEY vs. DENNIS JOSEPH GARCIA 
CASE NUMBER 080903244 Wrongful Death 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
PARTIES 
ROYAL I HANSEN 
Plaintiff - GAIL BUCKLEY 
Represented by: MARGARET H OLSON 
Defendant - DENNIS JOSEPH GARCIA 
Represented by: SYLVIA G ACOSTA 
y) ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
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CASE NUMBER 080903244 Wrongful Death 
02-25-08 Judge VERNICE TREASE assigned. 
02-25-08 Filed: Complaint No Amount 
02-25-08 Filed: Demand Civil Jury 
02-25-08 Fee Account created 





02-25-08 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO 
Description: JURY DEMAND - CIVIL, Mail 
02-25-08 JURY DEMAND - CIVIL Payment Received: 
155.00 
AMT S, Code 
Payment; 
75.00 
04-24-08 Filed: Answer 
DENNIS JOSEPH GARCIA 
04-30-08 Filed return: Summons with Affidavit of Service 
Party Served: GARCIA, DENNIS JOSEPH 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: April 14, 2008 
08-08-08 Filed: Joint Motion and Stipulation for Dismissal with 
Prejudice 
Filed by: ACOSTA, SYLVIA G 
08-12-08 Filed order: Order for Dismissal with Prejudice 
Judge VERNICE TREASE 
Signed August 12, 2008 
08-12-08 Case Disposition is Dismissed 
Disposition Judge is VERNICE TREASE 
08-17-12 Judge ANDREW H STONE assigned. 
11-02-12 Judge DENO HIMONAS assigned. 
03-24-14 Fee Account created Total Due: 3.50 
03-24-14 COPY FEE Payment Received: 
Note: 5.00 cash tendered. 1. 50 change 
03-16-15 Judge ROYAL I HANSEN assigned. 
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GA.IL BUCKELY, intli-vidup.Uy .md as personal representatwe of thL'I ESTATE OF 
'l'llOMAS SHANE BUCKELY V, DENNIS JOSEPH GARCIA 
· Thil'd Judicial Dlstnct Conrt, bi and for Salt Lake, State of Utah, Case No 
080903244 
Gene.-al Release and Settle~ent Agreement 
For and in considera.tion of tb payment to the undea1igo.ed, OAlL BUCKLEY, 
individually and on behalf of the estate and·heirs of THOMAS SHANE BUCK.ELY, for 
11nd fn the sum of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND AND 00/100 CENTS ($25,000.00), tho 
receipt and sufficienoy of whk.b are hereby acknowledged, the undersigned on her own 
behalf and for all hem, oicecutors, admini&llatots and assigns, does hereby RELEASE 
and FOREVER DISCHARGE UNITED AUTOMOB1LE INSURANCE COMPANY 
(hereinafter referred to as ''UNITED"), its offioora, directors, employees, :insurers and/or 
successors (collectively ''the parties'' and Its inSllI"ed(s), DENNIS JOSEPH GARCIA 
{hereinafter the 1'Insured11). if any. from. any claims, demands, obligations, actions, causes 
of action, losses of services, property damage, repairs, c.osts, tind expenses or 
compensations, of· any natUre whatsoever, resulting from or relating to the 
aforementioned claims nrislng from the car acctde.nt oCC\ll"ring on or about-March 8, 
2006, The details are more fully set forth in the litigation entitled GAU.. BUCKELY, 
individUQUy lllld es personal t~Ollentath'e of tho ESTATE OF TIIOMA.S SHANE 
BUCI<ELY V. DBNNlS JOSEPH OAllClA Civil No. 080903244, Third Judicjal District 
Court, S!ilt Lake County, Ste.te of Utah. It is int6Jlded, that this Agreement shall relievo 
United1 its officers, directors, employees, insums and/or 5uocessors and its insured, if 
any, :from any further duties, responsibili1ias1 or oblig11tfons relating to or arisiiig from the 
accident, or any other action or mactio1l by United o:r the insured relating thereto. · 
Nothing contained herein, nor the oonsununation of this Agreement, shall be 
construed or deemed ns IUl admission of liability, oulpability1 .negligence, or wrongdoing 
on the part of United or the iDsured. The Parties hereto ha:vo entered into this Agreem.m1t 
with the intention to avoid further litigation with its attendant inconveniences and 
expenses. Inespectiv:a of whether tllis Agreement is fully con&lmll'Dated, nothing 
contained herein, or a-cy prior draft bereo~ ot in any form of communication pertaining to 
the consummati_on of this Agreement. shall be construed or det1med at any Ume or plaoe, 
or in any proeeeding11, to be an admission or conco$S!on, expressed or implied, of any 
allegation, inference, implication, or charse or w,:oogdoing, liability. negligence, 
culpllhility, or lack thereof hy the Parli~. This Agreement may be pled or PSSerted by or 
on behalf of the Parties as a defense and complete b11r to 11JJ.Y action. claim, cou:uter-cbrlm, 
cross-claim, cause of action, demand or proceeding that mo.y be brought, inlJtituted, 01: 
taken, against ox on behnlf of the Parties with respect to any of the matters set forth 
herein, excepting only tmY obligations duly arising out of the terms of this Agreement. 
lt is understood end agreed that subject to the terms und conditions of this 
Agreement the payment of the SUJI1S referenced herein by or on behalf of United or Its 
insursd are made and aooepted in compromise lllld settlement of disputed claims, and that 
this Agreement shall terminate all issues which have been, might have been, or oould be 
raised io any suit, or action in ony co\lrt of law or equity, ot any judicial, quasi-judicial, 
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or administrative forum, arlmlg from or relating to the aforeme.ntioned claims and 
accident, and any otber ~tion or inaction by United or the insured relating thereto. 
The Po:rties represent at the time of execution of this Agreeme11t that they are 
authorized and competent to exeouto this Agreement, and furthermore, each of them 
acknowledge that they either hi\Vo sought and obtained the advice of counsel concerning 
the rights and obligationa confirmed by this Agreement or they ba.ve ex.pressly nnd 
knowingly waived the opport\lnity to seek and obtain the advice of counsel concerning 
the rights and obligations confirmed by this Agreement. 
The Parties each .acknowledge 1hat: (i) they are executing this Agreement in 
reliance so]ely on their own judgment, belie~ and knowledge, and upon the advice of 
their legal counsel if sought; (ii) no promise> inducement or agreement not herein 
expressed has been made to any Party by any other Party, or person aoting on b!s behalf; 
(iii) the terms and conditioJlS contained herein are contractual and not mere recltels; and 
(iv) this Agreement contains tl10 entire Agreement between the Parties hereto. 
This Agreement sets forth the entire understanding of the Parties replacing Wl.Y 
and all prior agreements relating to the subject matte, hereof. Thi~ Agreement may be 
changed, amended, or temtln.ated, only by a similar written instrument executed by all 
Pmties to be bound thereby. 
If any provision of this Agreement is he~d to be unlawfu~ invalid, or 
unenforceable u11der any present or future laws. such provision shall be fully sev.~able; 
and this Agreement shall then be constroed and enforced· as if such unlawful, invalid, or 
unenforoeable provision had not been a pnrt hereof. Tue remaining pro"Visions of thui 
Agreement shall remain in full force snd effect and shall not be affected by suah 
unlawful, invalid, or \tnonforceable provision or by its severnnQe therefrom. 
Furthennore, in lieu of such unla-wful, invalid or unenforceable provision, there shall be 
added automatically as a part of this Ag:reemen½ a provision as shnile.r in terms to such 
unlawful, invalid or unenforceable provision as may be possible nnd legal, valid end 
enforceable. · 
The individuals executing this Geperal Release and Se~oment Agreement 
represent that ea.ch has full authority to enter into and sign Uris Release and Agreement on 
behalf of the entities so released. 
2 
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Dated this~ da.y _of t \1~ 2008. 
. . ..... ... . - .--. .. . 
GA.Il., BUCKLEY, on behalf of tho b . 
Thomas Shane Bucldoy 
STATE OP UTA.II- ) 
COUNTY OF Ll.k Y1 /s. 
On this Ji_ day of , \l ,1.\1~1 -2008 person.ally appeared before 
me1 Gail Buckley known p~ to mo (ot satisfactorily proven) to be the peison(s) 
whose names &re subscribed to on this General e ase and Settlemeot"A9J:r.efi1ent, and 
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GARCIA, DENNIS JOSEPH USP# 47-· 
Gary R. Herbert 
Governor 
Clark A. Harms 
Chairman 
Offender# 184816 PCF BB 21 Printed 10/07/2010 
Page 1 of 1 
Members 
Curtis L. Garner 
Jesse Gallegos 
Robert S. Yeates 
Angela F. Micklos 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Consideration of the Status of _D_e_nn_i_s_J_o_se_,p._h_G_a_rc_ia _______ ~----
Offender # 184816 
USP # 4-"2=9=9'-'4 __ 
The above-entitled matter came on for consideration before the Utah State Board of Pardons on the 5th day of October, 
2010 for: · 
ORIGINAL HEARING 
After a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing, the Board makes the following decision and order: 
Results Effective Date 
1. EXPIRATION OF INMATE SENTENCE 4/15/2013 
Hearing Notes 
1. Other: The restitution owed of$ 7000.00 on Case# 06-1607 will be forwarded to the sentencing Court for a Civil Judgement. 
2. Final decision of the hearing held on 10/05/2010. 
No Crime _Se_n_t __ _ Ca_s_e_No_. __ .:..Ju=-d_.,gcc..e ________ Expiration 
1. AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE 0-5 061901607 SKANCHY 4/15/2013 
This decision is subject to review and modification by the Board of Pardons at any time until actual release from custody. 
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date 7th day of October, 2010, affixed my signature as 
Chairman for and on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons. 
Clark A. Harms, Chairman 
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GARCIA, DENNIS JOSEPH USP# 4t'"' Offender# 184816 PCF BB 21 
Gary R. Herbert 
Governor 
Clark A. Harms 
Chairman 
. -· 
.... _ ... 
Printed 10/13/201 O 
Page 1 o! 1 
Members 
Curtis L. Gamer 
Jesse Gallegos 
Robert S. Yeates 
Angela F. Micklos 
BEFORE THE SOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Consideration of the Status of .::.D..c.e:..:.nnc,;.:i.::.s..c.J..;;..os.::.e::.Jp:..:.h:..:.G=a:....:rc:....:ia::..._ _________ _ 
HEARING OFFICER RESULTS 
Offender# 184816 
USP #4 ...:..:2=9=94..,____ 
After a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing, the Board makes the following decision and order: 
Results Effective Date 
1. NOCHANGE 10/13/2010 
Hearing Notes 
1. No change in the expiration of inmate sentence on 04/15/2013. ·. , • 
2. Other: The restitution owed will be forwarded to the s~tencing0"c::ourt for a Civil Jildgerileht. 
3. The Board of Pardons is aware this is not a regular release date ... CLERICAL: ER~OR CORRECTED. 
No Crime _Se_n_t ___ C_as_e_N_o_. __ :=.;Ju=-=d==g-=-e ________ Expiration 
1. AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE 0-5 061901607 SKANCHY 4/15/2013 
This decision is subject to review and modification by the Board of Pardons at any time until actual release from custody. 
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date 13th day.of October, 2010, affixed my signature as 
Chairman for and on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons. 
Clark A. Harms, Chairman 
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Gary R. Herbert 
Governor 
Clark A. Harms 
Chainnan 
Angela F. Micklos 
l'ice Chair 
Jesse GaUegos 
Curtis L. Garner 
Robert S. Yeates 
Members 
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Family and Friends of Dennis Garcia 
3952 W. 8620 So. 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
To Whom It May Concern, 
May17,2011 
RE: Dennis Garcia 
Offender # 184816 
The Board of Pardons has received your letter and I have been asked to respond. You 
ask that re-consider the decision to keep Dennis in prison for the full five year term given 
by the Judge. 
As you may be aware, Dennis Garcia is in prison for Automobile Homicide, havipg 
killed his friend and passenger. The Board of Pardons has the administrative ability to 
give him the full five years, so it would appear very fortunate_ that Aaron only received 
the Third Degree Felony he did. 
Although we acknowledge the support at his Original Hearing, it was not a popularity 
contest, so no weight is given just because his friends were there, and the victim's family 
wasn't. I will send the inmate a copy of the Aggravating and Mitigating factors ifhe did 
not receive one. When released from prison, it is hoped that Dennis will never do another 
horrendous crime such as this. If he is working inside, it is hoped he has already started to 
pay the $7,000 burial expenses. As you have now brought that to our attention, I will 
send a copy of this to Crime Victims Reparations who will be seeking that restitution 
amount (CVR # 151627) as we will pursue a Civil Judgment against him. 
CC: Board file 
~ Dennis Garcia 
Caseworker Phillip Green 
Lori Maroney-CVR 
Respectfully, ,O_ 
~ ~ w vy: {; ·--
Kent Wm. Jones 
Senior Hearing Officer 
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Offender No: 184816 DENNIS GARCIA Location: PROMONTORY DD 11 
Utlh Department of Corrections 
NORM Offender Accounting System 
INMATE ACCOUNT STA'TEMENT 
From: 3/18/2013 To: 3/31/2013 
3/18/2013 3/31/2013 
Offender No: First Name: Last Name: Begin Bal: End Bal: 
184816 DENNIS GARCIA 78.76 45.37 
Transaction Detail 
Document No Posting Date Description Amount Balance 
1286469-001 3/18/2013 Commissary 03/18/13 -12.85 65.91 
1291862-001 3/25/2013 Commissary 03/25/13 -20.54 45.37 
AvaDable Balance as of 3/31/2013 45.37 
Victim Restitution 
Restitution Balance: Restitution Interest: Balance: 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
DISCLAIMER: The victim restitution information listed above is based upon data that is currently documented in 
NORM. There may be other outstanding victim obligations not yet entered. 
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,)ffender #: 184816 USP#; 42994 GARCIA, DENNIS JOSEPH 
Utah Department of Corrections 
SOUTH POINT 
STATEM.ENT, OF ACCOUNT 
Offender Account Activity 
Statement Date: 05/31/2008 To: 00,13/2008 
ACCOUNT TRANSACTION DETAIL: 
Account: GARCIA, DENNIS JOSEPH 
Account Balance: 64.68 
Trans. ID Trans. Date Transaction Description 
Beginning Balance 
1055149 06/05/2008 Cash Receipt - INTAKE 
1055848 06/09/2008 Commissary Purchase; Invoice 840536 
Ending Balance 
Victim Restitution (NORM}: 
Principle: $0.00 Interest: $0.00 Balance: $0.00 
Location: UINTA 3 
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DISCLAIMER: The victim restitution Information listed above Is based upon data that Is currently documented 
in NORM. There may be other outstanding victim restitution obligations not yet entered. 
MESSAGES: 
Please write to Inmate Accounting if you have any questions about your account. Thank you. 
Otfender #: 184816 USP #: 42994 GARCIA, DENNIS JOSEPH Location: UINTA 3 Cell: 209B 
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